Ground troops in Iraq, yet again?
Three years after US troops left Iraq, Washington is considering
reintroducing ground troops to fight the Islamic State (IS). Not
advisers, not beefed up embassy details; regular infantry and special
forces battalions.
The Islamic State's bold victories contrast with the tired proclamations
of aging al-Qaeda leaders and with the dismal defeats suffered by Arab
armies over the years.
IS may reap a huge crop of recruits and win the
allegiance of kindred Islamist groups across the Muslim world. It may
also win the allegiance of local populations who will reluctantly prefer
harsh rule to no rule at all - or to the rule of vengeful Shi'ites.
Compelling as the arguments for the deployment of US troops may be, caution is in order. The quick defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003 was followed by immense and unmanageable problems. The same may happen with a new round of US intervention.
IS forces and the war against them
It might be said that US troops have been less than successful against
insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam. That may give rise to the
conclusion that an Iraq redux will fare no better.
However, IS forces are not insurgents. As a putative state, they fight
in the open in large units, rely upon routine logistical systems, use
armor and artillery, and maneuver as would conventional units. The most
important characteristic of an insurgency is substantial support from
local populations, and IS has little if any. Indeed, it is widely
despised for imposing an austere form of Islam of dubious provenance on
the hapless inhabitants of towns and villages it captures.
If put into Iraq again, US troops will face conventional forces against
which they are well trained. Hence, a more useful comparison will be the
US fight against Iraq's army in 1991 and 2003 - wars in which US
maneuverability, firepower, and unit cohesion overwhelmed the enemy in a
shockingly short period of time. Regardless of one's perspective on the
desirability of American intervention, their effectiveness in
conventional operations is unmistakable.
Ground operations
American forces may be used in several ways. Operations will of course
include some indigenous troops whose contributions will be prominent in
Iraqi and American public affairs presentations.
Conventional land operations: First, troops can be
deployed on the long front with IS. The militants are badly outnumbered
and overstretched; US and allied troops can mass overwhelming numbers at
several points. These may be on main roads, around key towns, and near
assets such as dams and power stations.
Such drives will force IS to withdraw rapidly or concentrate troops for a
major battle. Whether in retreating convoys or defensive positions, IS
troops will be vulnerable to airpower. These operations will seek to
replicate the battles of Baiji and Kobane, where IS troop concentrations
were hit hard by from the air.
Commando operations: Quick insertions by air-mobile or
airborne units, perhaps no more than a few hundred, can attack IS
command and control centers, logistical hubs, training bases, and
economic assets well behind the lines and even in Syria. These strikes
would be of short duration and designed to maximize IS casualties and
the destruction of its assets. The threat of such operations will force
IS to keep more troops off the lines with adversaries, making regular
ground operations against IS more effective.
Large-scale insertions: There may be a bolder effort to
force IS into large-scale battles by inserting thousands of troops into
key towns along the Syrian-Iraqi border, again either by airmobile or
airborne landings. This would confront IS with the dilemma of fighting
large-scale battles - even larger than Kobane and Baiji - or seeing
their forces divided in two.
There are risks for US troops as well. They would be isolated and would
have to supplied by air. However, owing to the US's airpower and ground
force, large-scale battles will not favor IS.
Any of these operations will be designed to inflict serious and perhaps
unsustainable casualties and break the aura of invincibility and
inevitable victory that IS enjoys with Islamic youth. Simultaneously,
the attacks will bolster the confidence and aggressiveness of Iraqi and
Kurdish forces. However, a complete victory over IS will prove elusive
as it has options in both Syria and Iraq.
Risks and problems
It should be apparent to policymakers in Washington that their plans in
the region have not always worked out. Some potential problems readily
occur and might diminish any promise of a short-term operation that may
be circulating in the corridors of national security bureaus.
Islamist recruitment : Reintroduction of ground troops
will underscore prevalent narratives in the region proclaiming that the
US is trying to humiliate and subjugate the Islamic world. This can
boost recruitment for IS and kindred militant groups throughout the
region. It is already widely believed that IS and al-Qaeda were created
by the US and Israel to weaken existing states. Renewed ground
operations will be interpreted as an obvious followup in the grand
scheme.
Reluctant allies : Instead of strengthening the resolve
of Iraqi and Kurdish troops, American ground troops may have the
opposite effect. Indigenous forces, content to let American troops and
airpower assume the burden of the fighting and casualties, will be
tempted to be less aggressive. Their reluctance to fight will be
supported by the calculation that Iraqi and Kurdish troops may well
fight each other in the near future as issues of autonomy return to the
fore.
Involvement in Iraqi politics : US troops will almost
certainly find themselves enmeshed in sectarian hostilities once more.
This was the case in 2003 when the fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime
brought a Shia majority to power, which then pushed their former
oppressors into the margins. The Sunnis are now seeking autonomy from
their sectarian foes and will press for US support.
The US will be inserting itself into the conflict between the Kurds and
the Baghdad government. The Kurds already have their own army, flag,
constitution, and oil pipelines, and they now seek greater autonomy, if
not independence. There is the further problem of Sunni land and oil
infrastructure seized last summer as the army retreated from the IS
offensive.
Advancing Kurdish and Iraqi army units are destroying the dwellings of
Sunnis and pushing residents into Anbar province. Amid increasingly
intense ethnic and sectarian politics, the US mission could find that
intervention will become an open-ended peacekeeping mission - or
worse, US troops will face the wrath of one or more of the antagonistic
groups.
IS responses
Faced with superior ground troops, and powerless against airstrikes, IS
may abandon conventional warfare operations in Iraq. This will not come
easily to an organization that sees itself ordained to conquer and rule
the region.
IS may retreat into urban hideouts and wage a bombing campaign against
US troops and the Shi'ites. This would be done with the help of extant
Ba'ath party and army networks, which have helped IS and its al-Qaeda
predecessors since the 2003 invasion. IS may also benefit from the
support of Sunni tribes whose efforts to get support from Baghdad and
the US have thus far brought little.
IS in Syria : Efforts to find reliable troops in Syria to
carry on the war against IS have not met with success. Some Free Syrian
Army leaders, fearing that they will be seen as US proxies, have even
rebuffed Washington's appeals. American success in Iraq, then, may set
the stage for a protracted war with IS in Syria. This in turn may tempt
Washington to launch ground offensives into Syria.
Iran
An increased US presence in Iraq will set off alarms in Iran - despite
the fact that the US and Iran are on the same side regarding IS in
Iraq. Combined with Republican gains in the US Congress and the growing
possibility of a Republican president, Iranians will look warily to
their west and rethink the diplomatic opening with the US.
However, US-Iranian cooperation against IS in Iraq, limited and
unheralded though it is, may prove useful to Iran. The same can be said
of US-Iranian cooperation to the east in Afghanistan, where Tehran's
support for northern peoples' fight with the Taliban predates the US
entry in 2001. This makes Iran important in limiting Taliban efforts to
regain much of the country as International Security Assistance Force
troop levels dwindle. A neoconservative-influenced White House in 2017
may find itself handcuffed in its dealings with Iran by ongoing events
in Iraq.
Source: atimes.com
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