Ecco perché il partito islamista Ennahda ha perso la Tunisia...

Riconoscendo la sua sconfitta, riporta il quotidiano algerino lematindz.net, Ennahda, che intende rimanere in politica, ora vuole dare l'immagine di un partito islamista responsabile, accettando le regole del gioco. 

«Non si tratta di improvviso amore per i valori della libertà, dell'uguaglianza e della democrazia, ma di realismo politico. Rached Ghannouchi, quando ha detto al Washington Post del 12 dicembre 2013, che "la Tunisia è l'ultima candela ancora accesa della Primavera araba, nonostante tutti i venti che soffiando contro", si riferiva al fallimento della primavera araba». 

Il suo sostegno ai Fratelli musulmani egiziani, dopo la cacciata di Mohamed Morsi nel luglio 2013, sotto la pressione dei suoi mentori statunitensi ed europei che non volevano vedere la Tunisia trasformarsi come la Libia, e soprattutto dopo l'esplosione della violenza islamica sul Chambi e l'omicidio di Chokri Belaid e Mohamed Brahmi, due leader della sinistra e progressista, sia il leader islamico che il suo partito si sono tatticamente ritirati dalle posizioni estremiste.

Inoltre, prosegue il giornale, la sconfitta del partito islamista si spiega con due anni e mezzo di potere di Ennahda, che aveva portato, sia a livello politico che istituzionale, alla decostruzione dello Stato, all'emergere della Lega per la Protezione della Rivoluzione, milizia islamista in qualità di una polizia parallela che ne aveva chiesto la dissoluzione progressiva, ad un tentativo di raccolta forzosa nei quartieri della zakat, al controllo delle moschee e a una «colpevole indulgenza» verso il movimento jihadista. 

E soprattutto aveva portato ad un aumento delle tensioni sociali a causa delle promesse non mantenute di miglioramento sociale delle fasce sociali più povere, ad un peggioramento del clima economico, ad un calo del turismo che mantiene quasi due milioni di persone, ad un aumento della disoccupazione e della povertà e ad un forte calo del Pil. 

Inoltre, «gli aiuti promessi dal Qatar in cambio dell'islamizzazione della società sono stati un enorme bluff», e la promessa di portare il "turismo islamico" in Tunisia fatta da Rached Ghannouchi, destinato a sostituire i milioni di visitatori occidentali, è stata soltanto una promessa. Alla fine, il suo slogan "l'Islam è la soluzione" e il progetto politico che c'era dietro è fallito.

Source: AGC

Sinai: Terrorist presence becomes full-fledged insurgency

A week later, Egypt is still reeling from the coordinated attack in the Sinai that cost 31 soldiers their lives. Much of the reporting has focused on the government’s serious and measured response, and on reaction in Egypt, the region and beyond.

The price of all that reaction dominating media reports and commentary is that in many cases the impression remains – as indicated by the first reports – that the high loss of life was because of a single suicide bomber driving into a checkpoint in a vehicle loaded with explosives. As such, some may think that the government was overreacting.

But that was not the case. Insurgents had planted roadside explosives to target army or security forces rushing to the scene of the first explosion. The detonation of these hidden explosives contributed to the high death toll. Army investigators were reported as saying dozens were involved in this highly-coordinated attack, which benefited from experienced and possibly foreign hands not present until now in leading positions.

Rumors

According to rumors circulating among Sinai tribesmen, there is now a working relationship between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and a rejuvenated, enlarged Ansar al-Maqdis that has incorporated other local jihadist groups. There are reports from Syria that former Egyptian officers with jihadist sympathies, who had fled Egypt and now serve as a mainstay for ISIS intelligence, are involved.

In other words, Sinai is no longer a dangerous region subject to periodic terrorist attacks. This is now a full-fledged insurgency, in all likelihood operating from bases in Gaza close to the border with Egypt, and staffed increasingly by Egyptians and Gazans who are believed to have travelled to Syria and Iraq and have now returned.

As such, the government and army are taking measures quite typical of any authority seriously threatened by such an insurgency. Cairo’s determined response - including a state of emergency and curfew in Sinai, and construction of a buffer zone along the border with Gaza - is totally justifiable. Of course Hamas was quick to denounce the attack, chiefly so as not to provoke a massive Egyptian counter-attack.

Tiresome criticism

Egyptian military courts are now responsible for attacks against state institutions, and the media have been formally called upon not to publish anything that undermines military operations against insurgents. There has been predictable, almost tiresome criticism of these security measures by human rights organizations in Egypt and abroad.

What would be more helpful and relevant would be expressions of concern that evacuating Sinai civilians and destroying their homes will be counter-productive unless they are quickly reimbursed.

Sinai’s Bedouin population has long had grievances over their treatment, including their exclusion from private development projects, and the confiscation of tribal grazing lands. As such, if those displaced by the buffer zone are not handled properly, they will not provide intelligence on the whereabouts and movements of insurgents. They may even join their ranks.

However, part of the problem is on the Gaza side of the border, where Hamas has tolerated the same jihadist groups. It is critical that the recently-formed Palestinian unity government take over the administration of Gaza from Hamas. As a participant in the unity government - even though its members do not hold cabinet posts - Hamas should have no objection. However, if it does object, then the unity government is a farce.

At that point, the threat of a Hamas-tolerated or clandestinely-aided jihadist insurgency based in Gaza and raiding the Sinai would be cause for the Egyptian military to enter Gaza and destroy the insurgency and any armed resistance to such an intervention. Washington will no doubt express disapproval.

Source:  alarabiya.net

Ritratto di un combattente straniero di Daish (Islamic State)

Cosa porta uno straniero a raggiungere un gruppo terrorista islamico?

È fuorviante pensare che chi perpetra atti di terrorismo o di  genocidio abbia innate caratteristiche psicologiche e che sia fuori dalle norme. 

Anzi, le motivazioni che spingono una persona a tali atti non sono tanto diverse da quelle comunemente riscontrabili in ciascuno di noi: desiderio di comunità, rispetto e sicurezza, timore di esser messo da parte.

Come si diventa allora autore di tali misfatti? E com’è emerso il fenomeno di stranieri che vanno a ingrossare le file di Daish (conosciuto in Occidente come ISIS)? Daish è nato dall’instabilità e dal conflitto in Siria e in Iraq: perché alcuni occidentali hanno percorso migliaia di chilometri per partecipare a un conflitto che apparentemente non li riguarda?

Daish è composto da circa 35.000 combattenti, di cui un terzo sono stranieri. Questi possono essere divisi in fanatici e in ingenui. 

C’è che si unisce a Daish infervorato da un vero sentimento di fanatismo religioso e di militanza e chi ha una visione edulcorata di quale sia la reale posta in gioco del conflitto in Siria, semplificazione che emerge dalle varie defezioni, così come dalle domande superficiali che vengono poste sui network, come la necessità o meno di spegnere i cellulari durante uno scontro armato.

La maggior parte dei combattenti di Daish sono uomini sotto i 40 anni di età, ma è anche il primo movimento ad attrarre molte donne (10-15% delle reclute straniere). 

I Paesi da cui provengono più combattenti stranieri sono l’Arabia Saudita, il Marocco e la Russia (Cecenia), e da parte occidentale la Francia, la Gran Bretagna, il Belgio e la Germania.

Daish ha una strategia di reclutamento di combattenti stranieri molto più sofisticata di altri gruppi militanti. La maggior parte delle reclute stabiliscono un contatto con l’organizzazione via Internet, tramite i social media, invece di usare il vecchio metodo di proselitismo attraverso le moschee.

Le ragioni per entrare a far parte di Daish sono diverse: tante reclute non sono molto religiose, ma hanno piuttosto rifiutato l’Islam praticato dai loro genitori – che vedono come troppo “influenzato dalla cultura occidentale” – a cui preferiscono una militanza da autodidatta più violenta e radicale. 

Molte reclute, invece, entrano nel giro per motivi che non hanno niente a che vedere con la religione: alcuni sono solo annoiati e cercano qualcosa di avventuroso da fare, alcuni sono solo spinti dal narcisismo, in un tentativo di riscattare eventuali ferite come la discriminazione. Per queste persone, Daish è un modo per elevare il proprio status.

I gruppi terroristici come Daish sono formati da individui che scelgono liberamente di essere arruolati e abbracciano l’ideologia secondo la quale l’uso della violenza è un mezzo per raggiungere la purezza all’interno della comunità. 

Malgrado la maggior parte dei combattenti stranieri di Daish siano persone apparentemente “normali”, l’ideologia che praticano è genocida nelle sue implicazioni, è un ideologia distruttiva che necessita di una risposta umana collettiva.

Source Arabpress

Amnesty: Libya armed groups have committed war crimes

Human rights group Amnesty International said yesterday it had satellite pictures indicating that rival factions in Libya had committed war crimes by shelling densely populated residential areas in the west of the country.

Libya plunged into anarchy when an armed faction from the western city of Misrata seized Tripoli in August after fighting with militiamen from Zintan who had held the capital’s airport since the 2011 revolt that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi.

The situation has calmed in Tripoli somewhat but factional fighting continues west of the capital as well as in the major eastern port city of Benghazi.

Citing satellite images shown on its website, Amnesty said that fighters from both sides had indiscriminately fired rockets and artillery shells into hospitals and residential districts in parts of Tripoli and the western Warshafena region.

“Lawless militias and armed groups on all sides of the conflict in western Libya are carrying out rampant human rights abuses, including war crimes,” Amnesty said in a statement.

“Armed groups have possibly summarily killed, tortured or ill-treated detainees in their custody and are targeting civilians based on their origins or perceived political allegiances,” the London-based global rights advocate said.

It named the Misrata-led Operation Dawn, which has seized Tripoli, and their main opponents from Zintan and the Warshafena regions as responsible for gross rights violations.

Source:  thepeninsulaqatar.com

Syria war fuels sectarian tension in Lebanon

As Tripoli, Lebanon's second city, picks up the pieces following four consecutive days of clashes between ISIL-linked armed groups and the Lebanese army, experts and local figures question the reasons behind the army's unprecedented use of heavy force this time round.
 
"The Lebanese army is changing its approach towards armed groups in the north. It is [the army] coming in hot and hard on these groups," said Aram Nerguizian, a senior researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington DC. "The LAF is no longer willing to absorb punches," Nerguizian told Al Jazeera.

The recent round of fighting marked the worst spillover of Syria's war into the country since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusra Front fighters clashed in Arsal, on the Syrian border, in August.

The bout of violence, the deadliest since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, broke out on October 23, after an army patrol was attacked in the market area. The Lebanese army carried out raids in the city searching homes of individuals with alleged links to ISIL. 

According to an army statement, 162 armed suspects had been arrested since clashes broke out on Friday and at least 42 people, including 11 soldiers, were killed in the fighting with some 150 wounded.

Tripoli was calm on Wednesday October 29, as civilians returned to their homes after the army, backed by helicopter gunships, took over the fighters' strongholds including that of Shadi Mawlawi and Osama Mansour. Mawlawi and Mansour are reportedly linked to al-Nusra Front and have been leading the fight against the army.

During the recent battles, the army appeared to have overpowered the ISIL-linked fighters. This, says Nerguizian, was due to having learnt the lessons of the Abra clashes, which took place in June 2013 between the army and supporters of a Salafist sheikh in Saidon, south Lebanon, and in Arsal in August.
However, it remains to be seen whether the army-led counterattack  would set a new pattern for future altercations with the armed groups in the city.

"That depends on what happens on a broader regional level," Nerguizian added.

The US-led coalition against ISIL has put pressure on the regional players who fund armed groups in Lebanon, to end their cash flow, he explained.

Moreover, the army's exceptional use of force this time round was publicly supported by the country's political establishment including mainstream Sunni politicians, such as Future Movement leader Saad Hariri.

"At the top level, they have enough backing to take on Tripoli's armed groups," he said.
The arrest of Tripoli-based MP Khaled Daher's guard was a case in point.

An outspoken critic of Hezbollah, the MP was accused of being associated with Ahmed Salim Mikati, whom the army accuses of recruiting young Lebanese men to join ISIL.

Mikati's detention was believed to have triggered the recent wave of clashes on Friday. The fighters were calling for his immediate release.

On Saturday October 25, Daher condemned the arrest of his bodyguards.
Daher's alleged connection to Mikati, Nerguizian explained, proved that "some Future Movement MPs will not toe the party line and will keep pandering to a much more militant line, one that Hariri himself cannot sustain".

The clashes came in the context of stalled negotiations to free at least 27 Lebanese servicemen, captured in Arsal by ISIL and al-Nusra Front fighters in August.

According to sources who are in direct contact with the fighters, negotiations have so far failed to pick up speed because al-Nusra fighters have called for the release of Islamist prisoners in Roumyiah prison, as a key condition for the release of the abducted soldiers. This, however, has proved to be a thorny subject for the government.

But Sunni discontent has been on the rise even before the Arsal clashes. "Sectarian tensions, linked to the Syrian uprising, have been on the rise since Hezbollah sent its fighters to battle alongside the troops of the Syrian regime," said Abdullah Zakaria, the head of the union of municipalities in Akkar.
"The sympathy Sunnis feel for their Syrian brethren is compounded by the inequalities they have at home," he said.

"Many feel they are being unfairly targeted by the army for supporting the [Syrian] revolution, whereas Hezbollah can send its men to fight openly."

"A marginalised few within the Sunni community perceive the army as a tool in the hands of Hezbollah," explained Sheikh Abdel Rahman Akkari, who resides in Minyeh and is acquainted with Mawlawi.
"The men who attacked the army did so because it implemented a harsh security plan [last March] and was monitoring them."

Additionally, years of underdevelopment have left young men with no jobs amid dire economic conditions which served as a vehicle for recruiting fighters.

"Shadi is a simple man," Akkari said of the fugitive commander. Mawlawi had a small number of followers in the north after his arrest in May 2012 on charges of terrorism. He was subsequently released on bail. "But just a few Sunnis in the north sympathise with him."

The same goes for Sheikh Khaled Hablas, another controversial figure who notoriously issued an edict calling on Sunnis to defect from the army.

 "I've been in contact with him," Akkari said. "He started calling for a Sunni revolution after MPs failed to address complaints that men in Tripoli were being treated badly at army checkpoints."
 
Both experts and local religious figures downplayed the possibility of mass Sunni defections from the army as a result of the recent confrontation. 

Last week three soldiers from north Lebanon, defected to fight with armed groups, including Abed-Elkader Akoumi who joined ISIL as well as Mohammed Antar and Abdallah Shehadeh, who joined the al-Nusra Front.

"When three desert from a total combat unit of 22,900 fighters [the number of Sunni soldiers in the army], it's not a sign of a threat," said Nerguizian.

"But the fact that those who defected came from communities that are hard-hit by unemployment and unequal distribution of aid since 1990, points to the kind of investment that should be made in the north by the government."

Source: Al Jazeera

Tripoli occupata dagli islamisti?

Al-Arabiya riporta che Ansar al Sharia ha annunciato di aver completamente occupato la capitale libica, Tripoli.

La rivendicazione è stata smentita dal generale Haftar contro cui le forze islamiste stanno combattendo negli ultimi giorni nella capitale.

Le forze islamiste hanno preso il controllo del quartier generale militare di Bengasi e la vicina caserma del XXI Battaglione. Unico dato certo è che in questi giorni Ansar al Sharia ha catturato grandi quantità di armi, come si evince dalle numerose foto pubblicate sui profili twitter dei combattenti.

Libia, violenti scontri a Bengasi

Pesanti combattimenti si sono avuti nel centro di Bengasi nella notte del  29 ottobre.

Veicoli dell’Esercito nazionale libico con cannoni antiaerei sono stati posizionati sulla via principale della città, Jamal Abdel Nasser Street (nella foto) bloccando le forze avversarie. 

I combattimenti tra l'esercito e le forze islamiste del Consiglio rivoluzionario della Shura di Bengasi erano iniziati la notte precedente nei quartieri Salmani e Kish, come riportato da civili e gruppi di vigilantes. Gli scontri di Salmani si sono concentrati intorno alla rotonda di Al-Jaraa, una delle più grandi della città, e da lungo tempo checkpoint di Ansar Al-Sharia. Non sono sono state comunicate vittime dai medici della Mezzaluna Rossa operanti in zona. 

Ulteriori combattimenti sono poi continuati in altre parti della città. Si ritiene che ci siamo qui state diverse vittime poiché diversi proiettili hanno raggiunto un corteo funebre nel distretto di Majouri, come si evi che dalle foto postate dai social network.  Gli scontri sono poi proseguiti intorno a Garyounis vicino alla università di Bengasi, già colpita da missili il 28 ottobre. 

Agli scontri hanno partecipato prevalentemente la Brigata 17 febbraio e Brigata dei Martiri di Brega, sul versante del Consiglio rivoluzionario della Shura di Bengasi e i carri armati della 204a Brigata. 

Testimoni oculari hanno riferito di attacchi aerei da parte delle forze filo-governative. Sia la Mezzaluna Rossa che  le forze speciali Saiqa hanno chiesto ai residenti di rimanere in casa per quanto possibile: la Mezzaluna Rossa ha chiesto la gente di Bengasi di stare lontano dalle finestre, di cercare di soggiornare nelle camere centrali degli appartamenti e di rimanere ai piani bassi dei palazzi; Saiqa ha chiesto ai residenti di proteggere le proprie case, rimanervi all'interno e non ostacolare il lavoro dell'esercito nazionale.

Tunisia’s jihadists: sons of
a nation in transition

Tunisia is still sending jihadists to Syria, albeit at a more modest rate than before. Promises made by the Tunisian government to work on restricting the phenomenon slowed the initial surge, but have not brought it to an end. Over the last few months as the Islamic State (ISIS) overran opponents in Syria and Iraq, Tunisian suburbia has seen a wide ranging movement of enrollment into the group.

As few Tunisian jihadists have returned to their homeland from their wars in foreign lands, their numbers abroad have steadily increased since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Today, approximately 5,000 Tunisians are “waging jihad” in Syria and Iraq. The vast majority of them are fighting with ISIS, while a smaller number has joined the Al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham. Approximately 2,000 of these Tunisian jihadists have died in combat in Syria. These numbers come from Tunisian civil society organizations, while state authorities admit to figures that are almost as high.

However, what is more important than these estimates is that you rarely meet anyone in Tunisia who does not know of a relative, neighbor, colleague or friend who has “emigrated” to Syria. With the passage of time many details connected to this phenomenon have become clear, and discussion of the subject has become more coherent. The large number of people with acquaintances who have gone on “jihad” in Syria, Iraq and Libya indicates over 5000 Tunisians went to fight in Syria. It is rare to find an area of Tunisia where there hasn’t been a case of a young man who went to Syria.

You can meet an art-college teacher who tells you that the brother of one of his female students was killed in Syria, a journalist who tells you that the janitor in his building had a cousin who met the same fate, or a businesswoman who says her housekeeper’s two sons went off to fight. Everyone here in Tunisia has a story about “jihad” in Syria. There are even many “security agents” - the name given to people working in Tunisia’s intelligence agencies - whose brothers and relatives have gone to fight with takfiri groups in Syria.

The phenomenon’s accumulative effect has made it possible to observe new factors that “going abroad for jihad” did not witness in the past, either in Tunisia or elsewhere. The new jihadists are not poor. Hailing from middle or lower middle class groups, they are the sons of a modern and corrupt education system who left the country at a time when that system was going through a momentous upheaval brought by the revolution and the post-revolutionary state. The large movement out of the country that took place under the rule of the post-revolutionary state seems almost like a disguised expulsion of groups whose relation to the revolution and what followed it remained uncertain.

Almost sixty percent of them left for “jihad” shortly before they were due to graduate from university, and they were not poor academic performers. On the contrary, some of them were distinguished students. Most had recently devoted themselves to religion, and many of them had lived a wild life of alcohol and drug consumption. They devoted themselves to religion only a few months before leaving Tunisia for “jihad,” becoming more attached to rituals of piety and accelerating their progression from one phase to another until reaching the climax of “jihad.” This process unfolded over a few months, suggesting that the world they were living in before devoting themselves to religion must have collapsed completely during that short period.

A search for values

These youths are not destitute paupers as we previously thought when the phenomenon began to take shape. Most of them have come from Tunisia’s economically successful coastal areas; the areas that the Ben Ali regime, and the Bourguiba regime before it, counted upon as the main support base for their rule. Meanwhile, the inland areas, which are seen today as the Islamist Ennahda movement’s support base, have made a smaller contribution.

This is also a sign that the “jihad in Syria” phenomenon has been fueled by the complete collapse of an economic, social and educational system, and by a lack of values in the wake of the former regime’s demise. However, this certainly does not mean that there is any direct correlation between “jihad” and the values of the former regime. It means there is a correlation between “jihad” and the collapse of that regime, as for the most part the jihadists came out of that regime’s strongholds.

They are the sons of the educational system Ben Ali’s regime inherited from Bourguiba’s. They are also the sons of low-level civil servants and employees in private companies that made their money from jobs the regime institutionalized. They did not believe in the regime, but they lived under its rule without incurring any great damage. They are not traditionally the sons of pro-Ennahda families; some of them belong to pro-RCD families (former supporters of Ben Ali’s party the Constitutional Democratic Rally) and some of them are from families that were not politically active in the past. This certainly does not mean that Ennahda had nothing to do with their decision to “wage jihad.” In fact many signs suggest that the Tunisian Islamist movement helped facilitate their departure, especially during the time it was in power between 2011 and 2014.

These brief impressions are the result of reading the profiles of 150 Tunisian jihadists who went to Syria and Iraq. The profiles were put together by the Rescue Association for Tunisians Trapped Abroad, an organization that includes several families of jihadists in Syria.

Amin al-Susi is a retired Tunisian army officer whose son Mohammad went to fight, and died, in Syria. “My son was a distinguished student in university,” he says. “He went to Syria around a month before graduating. Even before he devoted himself to religion he was a secretive young man. His relationship with his mother was very strong.”

There are three points in what Mohammad said about his son that recur when the families of other jihadists in Syria talk about their children. The first is high academic achievement that does not culminate in graduation. The second is a strong relationship with the mother, suggesting estrangement from the father or a response to the lack of any relationship with the father. As for the third point, which was secrecy and introversion in the case of Mohammad al-Susi, it varies from case to case. Some youths were similar to Mohammad, while others came to “jihad” from wild and radical lifestyles that deviated from traditional values. Other youths were completely separated from family traditions and were usually deeply engrossed in academic study.

Affluent lifestyle

Amm Hassan, who preferred not to use his real name because his son is in prison, says that the young man went to Syria in March 2013. He stayed there for around two months before calling his father and asking him to pay for a ticket back to Tunisia from Turkey’s Hatay Airport. When he returned he was arrested in the airport and imprisoned for forty days before being released. Nevertheless, the young man soon regained his enthusiasm when ISIS began its successful advances in Iraq and Syria. He tried to leave the country again, but the Tunisian authorities arrested him and three of his friends on the Libyan border, where they were heading for a flight to Turkey and then Syria.

Amm Hassan says that his son Abdul Rahman returned from Syria after losing his faith in “jihad,” but while he told his father stories of emirs in the Al-Nusra Front who crossed over to ISIS and lived in luxury, his Salafist friends gathered money to pay for plane tickets, and then headed for Syria. The young man came back having lost his faith in “jihad” then built his conviction back up. Like many others he was on the verge of graduating from university. He was studying computer science in Tunis University, where he was an exemplary student. Abdul Rahman’s father says that a mosque and a computer were behind his son’s recruitment on both occasions.

The father of Rashid, a young Tunisian man who left for Syria two years ago and has not contacted his family since, distinguishes between the Salafism of Ben Ali’s time, which he says was peaceful and the type of Salafism that arrived with Ennahda. He says that his neighbor, who lives in the Douar Hicher area, is peace-loving and does not own a computer - a clear sign of the family’s conviction that a computer was what corrupted their son’s mind. It seems that the families are firmly convinced by the mosque-computer-Ennahda equation despite the fact that their sons were never members of the Ennahda movement.

The new emigration

Over the past six months the phenomenon of travel to Syria has become active once again. More groups have left from Douar Hicher, and a few days ago news arrived that several young men were killed. Nidal Salemi is one of the dead. His family in Douar Hicher received the news in a telephone call from Syria. Nidal, who was 24-years old and had only been in Syria for a few months, was Rashid’s second cousin.

The measures taken by the Tunisian government, rather than effectively restricting travel to Syria seem only to have made it more complicated. Family permission for travel to Turkey was the condition set by the government to prevent young people heading to Syria. This was sidestepped by heading to Libya first and after that to Turkey. When travelers headed for Libya were put under scrutiny, people went to Morocco, which Tunisians do not require a visa to enter, and from there to Turkey.

They tried, they failed

In fact, the easy-going measures taken by the Tunisian government make the questions raised by the families of these young jihadists worth considering. The large number of young men leaving for “jihad” would not have been able to grow if government measures had been serious. On more than one occasion Interior Minister Lutfi Ben Jeddo, who still holds the post he assumed under the former Ennahda government’s rule, has provoked an uproar over the role his ministry played in the case.

While he says that around 9,000 Tunisian youths were prevented from going to Syria, 600 jihadists are known to have left in the last three months alone. Moreover, it was the same minister who unleashed the “Jihad al-Nikah” media frenzy when he announced last year that 100 young Tunisian women had returned from Syria after practicing “sexual jihad.” Subsequently, the Minister of Women’s Affairs from the same government revealed to Al-Hayat that there was no truth to the statement at all, and that her ministry had not been able to find any of the young women the minister claimed had returned.
Ben Jeddo’s statement was interpreted as an attempt to cast doubt on the jihadist phenomenon by spreading implausible stories that would make attempts to explain it seem illogical and impossible to believe.

It is not neighborhoods, universities or mosques alone that made Tunisian youths turn from their former lifestyles and devotion to religion to a new type of piety; computers also played a role. That is what their families constantly repeat to people who ask. These young men isolate themselves in their rooms, stay up all night and sleep during the day, says Rashid’s mother. Within a short period of time, they stop telling their mothers what is happening in their lives, and after just a few months they become jihadists—strangers within their own families.

Ahmad, who managed to unlock his brother’s computer after he left for Syria, said that the idea of “jihad” takes root in the minds of young men when they begin to tell a sheikh about past acts that make them feel guilty. These feelings of guilt are usually related to dating a girl, drinking alcohol or frequenting a bar. The sheikh then begins to amplify the young man’s feelings of guilt, turning them into major offenses for which the young man has to do a great deal for penance, the ultimate penance being “jihad in Syria.”

Universities are not tolerating this sheikh-disciple relationship and mosques are open to monitoring by security forces, especially after the international pressure Tunisia has been subject to since ranking as the top country exporting jihadists. The direct relationship between sheikh and disciple has proved to be the most effective recruitment technique. Ahmad found out that Rashid’s sheikh is Tunisian and managed to discover his identity. It also transpired that the man has a son the same age as Rashid, who he did not sent on “jihad.”

Source: Al Hayat

Islamic State uses intelligence to purge opponents

The Islamic State (IS) differs from its predecessors and similar groups by running a powerful intelligence apparatus that is strong and has plenty of security experience acquired by intelligence officers from the previous regime. 

The IS intelligence apparatus carries out various types of operations, similar to other intelligence apparatuses around the world. One of its most important operations is to monitor and identify its opponents, to eliminate them immediately and to avoid the possibility of the Iraqi government, and other local and regional opposing parties, to infiltrate its intelligence apparatus, or a military opposition to emerge on its territory.

 

Based on IS operations, the list of people to eliminate includes tribal sheikhs who have previously cooperated with the government, members of the Awakening movement who have participated in fighting jihadist groups in the past, clerics who oppose IS' extremism and anyone suspected of delivering security information to governmental parties or other cooperating parties.

The policy of eliminating opponents as soon as they take over large areas is considered an established IS method that was adopted when it evolved in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. In addition to the security reasons, this technique is also based on IS' extremist Salafist principles, which aim to purge the land of any opposition party, to create a unified Salafist community without religious or political differences.

Ground campaigns against IS have increased since the formation of the international alliance that launched airstrikes on IS sites, leading to the group's elimination from regions it previously occupied. In addition to this, assassinations started being carried out against the IS leadership in Mosul and other Iraqi regions, which pushed the group to further tighten its security and eliminate a large number of suspects.

Several IS leaders were targeted, including Abu Anas al-Kurdi, an official in one of the military wings of Mosul, who was killed during an airstrike on Sept. 29. A source in Mosul told Al-Monitor that IS tightened its security after the attack by limiting prominent leaders’ appearances in public as well as arresting people suspected of delivering information to newspapers or any other external parties.

Al-Monitor interviewed a field activist in the city of Hit, two days after it fell into IS hands on Oct. 13, after a significant advance in Anbar province that included most of its cities. The source said that some residents were IS members without the knowledge of their neighbors. After IS took over, the militants eliminated anyone who was inciting people against IS, or working with the army and opposing tribes. People are eliminated based on the information provided by residents who are IS members.

The source said that the number of victims is high and the punishments are extremely cruel. A number of activists who criticized IS’ arbitrary and extremist measures were slaughtered in the city. Everyone who opposes the group’s extremist religious measures, such as imposing the niqab on women, is subject to punishment. IS raises its flag on top of the victims’ homes to make examples of them, so others know that someone has been punished. Group executions occur every now and then, where prisoners whom the group had kidnapped during battle are eliminated.

The terror prevailing over Mosul has led an enormous number of residents to flee and take refuge in Shiite-dominated western regions. Al-Monitor witnessed long lines of refugees at the entrance to the city of Karbala, waiting for security clearance to enter the city. These procedures can take days due to the large number of refugees and the lack of facilities to receive them.

IS reacts strongly against its opponents, out of fear of an opposition force emerging from within the Sunni entity, like in 2008 after establishing the Awakening movement, where the Islamic State of Iraq lost its lands due to damaging strikes by the movement. IS is well aware that a significant threat would be the emergence of a Sunni military opposition, fighting it inside the lands it occupies.

IS has carried out extensive religious separation in the regions it occupies, by disposing of all non-Sunni elements such as Shiites and other religious minorities, to end all social relations between the tribes and the Iraqi elements. The purpose of this is to eliminate the possibility of having a Sunni force willing to cooperate with Shiites to fight IS. On the other hand, the group’s policy of terror led its opponents to flee the IS-controlled regions or to at least stay silent and not criticize its actions.

It is unlikely that an effective Sunni force will rise against IS, due to the loss of communication between political Sunni leaders and their popular bases. There are no decisive measures against the group, and the Iraqi government is incapable of changing the military equation in the Sunni regions. Thus, IS is expected to remain for a long time in the Sunni regions.

Source: Al Monitor

ISIS fighters seen with advanced antiaircraft missiles 

Fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have reportedly laid their hands on sophisticated antiaircraft missile systems, raising with that the threat to air operations carried out by the U.S.-led coalition fighting against the group in Iraq and Syria.

Images from a video released by ISIS captured a fighter firing Chinese-made surface-to-air missile FN6 – and blowing an Iraqi army MI-35M during a battle in the oil-rich town of Baiji, north of Baghdad, according to the New York Times. Two crew members were reportedly killed as a result.

 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/28/ISIS-fighters-seen-with-sophisticated-antiaircraft-missiles-.html

 

Why the route cause of IS support in Lebanon is poverty not terrorism

A diplomatic report sent to Beirut recently touched on the result of a poll published earlier this month by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which showed that just 1 percent of Lebanon’s Sunni population has a positive opinion of ISIS. Of the 1,000 Lebanese interviewed for the survey, not a single Christian, Druze or Shiite respondent was supportive of ISIS.

Still, that means there are probably “a few thousand” ISIS sympathizers in Lebanon, according to David Pollock, the director of the Washington Institute’s Fikra Forum, who designed the survey.

According to the diplomatic report, Lebanon could capitalize on this widespread rejection of ISIS through a series of political and developmental steps, particularly in light of the fact that poverty is a root cause of violence and terrorism.

Second, the report said frank dialogue was needed between all Lebanese factions to allay concerns or fears that any of the groups was resorting to terrorism to shift the balance of power in Lebanon, as such actions would be destructive for all involved.

Third, the document recommended officials and politicians communicate to the public that ISIS would be highly detrimental to the Sunni community and would not address its grievances as claimed, something that was made clear by the fighting in Tripoli over the weekend that led to the aerial bombardment of the city’s marketplace.

According to the report, the only way to prevent terrorism from taking hold in Lebanon was by rebuilding state institutions, ending the five-month presidential vacuum and electing a new Parliament instead of extending its term for a second time, a move that would erode the democratic process.

The report warned that delaying the drafting of a new election law – which would be based on proportional representation in order to fairly represent all Lebanese groups – could provide a favorable environment for everything from terrorism and religious fanaticism to violence and corruption.

In spite of all these bad signs, however, a centrist politician described Lebanon as “unstable, but [it] will not totally collapse.”

He said Arab, regional and international developments had paralyzed state institutions in Lebanon and that there were still no signs of an imminent breakthrough on the presidential deadlock, parliamentary elections, or Cabinet productivity.

To a large extent, the situation in Lebanon has become connected to external developments and will remain in limbo until the various regional conflicts are resolved, he added.

In the meantime, things in Lebanon will remain relatively calm, but there is unlikely to be any radical solution to the country’s economic, social and financial problems.

On the security level, the politician said Western countries were deeply concerned with what was happening in the north and along the eastern border with Syria.

But he said that Lebanon was different from other countries in the region due to the fact that it does not have a particularly favorable environment for jihadist ideologies, and was being protected by an international decision to prevent the country from totally exploding.

As the status-quo in Syria remains unchanged, the politician said, Lebanon would have to wait for the outcome of the ongoing American-Iranian talks over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, which are also expected to tackle the country’s role in the region.

It would also be important to examine how Saudi-Iranian ties would develop, the politician said.
He revealed that US decsion-makers were deeply divided on the fate of Syrian President Bashar Assad, with some strongly insisting he stay in power and others campaigning for him to step down.

According to the centrist politician, the crisis could be resolved by keeping Assad in his post but stripping him of most of his powers, which would instead be distributed to governors, the prime minister, Parliament and the Syrian Army.

He added that any solution under which a national unity government was formed in addition to the deployment of international peacekeeping forces was a proposal worth considering.

Source:  albawaba.com

Peshmerga, heavy weapons arrive in Turkey to support Kobani

A group of Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces have arrived at Turkish Sanliurfa province who will travel onwards to the Syrian town of Kobani, an AA correspondent at the scene confirmed early Wednesday.

A separate truck convoy carrying the peshmerga's heavy weaponry also entered Turkey via Habur border pass in the southeastern province of Sirnak.

The convoy escorted by Turkish police and gendarmerie teams was headed to Sanliurfa where they are expected to cross over into Kobani to join fighters battling the militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, since mid-September.

A private plane carrying Peshmerga forces landed at Turkey's GAP Airport from Erbil International Airport at 01.15 a.m, local time.

The Kurdish regional government in Iraq has sent its forces to fight alongside the Kurdish groups in Kobani under a special arrangement with Turkey.

"All preparations are complete and the peshmerga will leave as soon as possible to help defend Kobani," Halgurt Hikmet, a spokesman for the Kurdish regional rule's ministry of peshmerga affairs, had said earlier Tuesday.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu had said Tuesday that 150 Iraqi Peshmerga fighters would enter Kobani "at any moment." Cavusoglu gave the statement during a live TV interview.

The minister said the logistical details of the Kurdish fighters entering the Syrian border town, how and from where, would be dealt with by "related military officials."

Turkish security officials have taken extensive security measures at the airport and along the entire route.

Source:  albawaba.com

Lebanese military foil ISIS attempt to establish emirate in Tripoli: sources 

Lebanon’s military have halted an attempt by extremist groups to establish an Islamic emirate centered around the city of Tripoli after more than four days of fighting, an official source said on Monday.

A Lebanese military official, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media, said that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters had been seeking to take over the port city and declare it part of the “caliphate” it established on Iraqi and Syrian territory earlier this year, when it declared its leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi the leader of the world’s Muslims.

Lebanese military and security forces successfully drove the Islamist fighters out of Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city, after four days of fighting that left at least 42 people dead and hundreds more injured. Lebanese officials and politicians hailed the operation a success as efforts continue to pursue and capture the fleeing militants, including Sheikh Khaled Hablas of the city’s Haroun Mosque and fighters affiliated to his group.

Sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that ISIS gunmen were fighting alongside Al-Nusra Front fighters and other Sunni militants against the Lebanese authorities, in what analysts have described as a dangerous development. ISIS and Al-Nusra Front have clashed repeatedly in Syria; it is as yet unclear whether this was a temporary alliance against the Lebanese army or if the ISIS-Al-Nusra Front cooperation represents a broader movement on the ground and could affect the fighting in Iraq and Syria.

The Lebanese military source confirmed that Al-Nusra Front leader Imad Ahmed Juma had sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in August. The source added that Juma and his fighters participated in the attempt to take control of Tripoli, fighting alongside ISIS militants.

Tripoli residents, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat after the liberation of the city, said that they believed the militant’s main objective had been to establish a land bridge from Syria’s Qalamoun mountains to the Lebanese coast.

Captured fighters reportedly informed Lebanese authorities that the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Tripoli had been the first phase of a broader plan to establish control of other cities along the Lebanese western seaboard. ISIS and its affiliates would also have sought to transfer and receive fighters and arms via these ports.

Captured Al-Nusra Front commander Ahmed Mikati confirmed the ISIS plans, the Lebanese military official told Asharq Al-Awsat. Mikati had also implicated a number of others in the plot to establish an emirate, including well-known Lebanese Salafist Sheikhs Kamal Al-Bustani and Khaled Hoblos, among others.

Mikati said that ISIS had been seeking to carry out the “Mosul scenario” in Tripoli and the surrounding area. ISIS fighters took over the northern city Iraqi city of Mosul in June and quickly pushed on to secure the surrounding villages and territory after locking down the city, entrenching their grip on the region.

The Al-Nusra Front commander said that the militants were planning to quickly occupy Tripoli’s surrounding villages before moving on to secure other areas in Lebanon. “The first phase of the plan was to completely takeover Tripoli with the objective of securing a land bridge connection between Qalamoun in Syria with the Lebanese coast,” Mikati said.

Tripoli residents who fled the fighting have begun returning to the city with even more army reinforcements expected to be dispatched to the region within the next few days, local media reported. Although many ISIS-Al-Nusra Front fighters were killed or captured in the fighting, many others remain on the run with Lebanese security and military patrols now seeking to capture them and secure the situation on the ground.

Source:  aawsat.net

Islamists close to seizing Libya’s oil

Egypt has warned that militant groups are poised to seize control of Libya’s oilfields, as the country’s foreign minister appealed for an expansion of the Western-led campaign against Daesh to tackle extremism threatening North Africa.

Sameh Shukri, the Egyptian foreign minister, used a visit to London on Monday to push for a new approach from Britain and the West to Islamist violence in Egypt and its neighbours, modelled on the campaign targeting the Daesh.

“The natural resources in Libya represents a very large pool of wealth and funding that will fund terrorist activity not only there but in other parts of the world,” he told The Daily Telegraph.

“You see [Daesh] in Iraq utilising petrol and the black market and in Libya this is a danger that will have a big impact for us.”

Six months after the Egyptian leader, Abdul Fattah Al Sissi, was elected president following the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Mursi, Shukri said the organisation was behind violence similar to Daesh in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere in North Africa.

Egypt has supported the Libyan government against Islamist militias that now control most of the country’s big cities and large swathes of territory, though not yet the oilfields.

“We have a struggle against similar organisations that are an offshoot of other terrorist ideologies like the [Muslim] Brotherhood and all these organisations support each other. We have seen terrorists from Daesh move from Iraq and Syria to Sinai, even Nigeria. The interconnected nature of all these organisations has to be recognised.”

Given the shared ideological roots of the Muslim Brotherhood and violent Islamist movements, Shukri said the fight could not be won in Iraq and Syria alone.

“All of us attempting the eradication of a terrorist organisation in one area will need to have greater cooperation in another if we are to comprehensively deal with this threat,” he said.

Egypt has welcomed Downing Street’s decision to commission a report into the scope of Muslim Brotherhood activities both in the UK and around the world, as the post-revolutionary government seeks the isolation of its strongest rival.

Although the document will not be published until the end of the year, leaks have indicated that Britain will take action against Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups where there are suspicions of financing or involvement with suspicious activities abroad.

Al Sissi has declared the Muslim Brotherhood to be a terrorist group, although it has said it is peaceful and rejected links to the attacks. Shukri said Britain should aim at the group’s finances, organisational structures and “ability to continue to promote violence extremism”.

He pressed Philip Hammond, the Foreign Secretary, to increase cooperation over “common security threats” over lunch at Carlton House Terrace yesterday and later met with cross-party groups in the House of Commons.

After 33 members of the security forces were killed last week by attacks on the Sinai Peninsula blamed on the Ansar Beit Al Maqdis group, Hammond promised to intensify cooperation with the Cairo government.

Source: gulfnews.com

Secularists set for Tunisia win

Tunisia's Ennahda party, the first Islamist movement to secure power after the 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts, yesterday conceded defeat in elections that are set to make its main secular rival the strongest force in parliament.

Official results from Sunday's elections '“ the second parliamentary vote since Tunisians set off uprisings across much of the Arab World by overthrowing autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali '“ were still to be announced.

But a senior official at Ennahda, which ruled in a coalition until it was forced to make way for a caretaker government during a political crisis at the start of this year, acknowledged defeat by the secular Nidaa Tounes party.

'We have accepted this result, and congratulate the winner Nidaa Tounes,' the official, Lotfi Zitoun, said. However, he repeated the party's call for a new coalition including Ennahda. 'We are calling once again for the formation of a unity government in the interest of the country.'

Earlier, a party source said preliminary tallies showed the secular party had won 80 seats in the 217-member assembly, ahead of 67 secured by Ennahda.

'According to the preliminary results, we are in the lead and in a comfortable position,' one Nidaa Tounes official said.

Electoral authorities were due to give preliminary results later, but larger parties had observers at polling stations to oversee the initial counts, allowing them to tally results unofficially.

A Nidaa Tounes victory will open the way for the return of some Ben Ali-era figures who have recast themselves as technocrats untainted by the corruption of his regime, but possessing the administrative skills to run the country.

Even with an advantage over Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes will need to form a coalition with other parties to reach a majority in parliament and form a government. Ennahda may still be part of any cabinet.

Led by Beji Caid Essebsi, a former parliament speaker under Ben Ali, Nidaa Tounes emerged in 2012 as a political force by rallying opposition to the first Ennahda-led government when Islamists won around 40 per cent of seats in the first assembly.

Source:  gulf-daily-news.com

Violent militant clashes in Yemen kill 30

Thirty people, most of them Houthi militants, were killed late on Sunday during violent clashes – that continue to rage – with tribal militants in Manaseh, an area in the central Yemeni province of Al-Bayda', a tribal source said.

He told Anadolu Agency that the clashes erupted after tribal militants had besieged Houthi militants in Manaseh, which they captured earlier on Sunday.

The clashes continue to rage until now, leaving 30 people dead on both sides, but most of the victims were Houthis, the source said, expecting the death toll from the clashes to rise in the coming hours.

The source said some people had talked about the death of Sheikh Maguid al-Zahab, an ally of the Houthis who helped them enter Manaseh and capture it.

A tribal source told AA earlier that Shiite Houthi militants had captured Manaseh, the most important stronghold of Al-Qaeda in the central province of Al-Bayda'.

The source added that the Shiite militants had controlled the area after armed tribesmen and Al-Qaeda militants had pulled out of it under intensified air and artillery attacks.

Manaseh is the most important stronghold of Al-Qaeda in Al-Bayda', being the location of the home of Al-Qaeda leader Nabil al-Zahab.

Earlier in the day, Houthis controlled a mountain overlooking Manaseh, which eased the mission of controlling the area for them.

Houthis and Al-Qaeda have been fighting over control in Al-Bayda' for several days now. The Shiite movement has been controlling the Yemeni capital Sanaa since September 21, but it is now moving to extend its control to other areas.

Yemen has been in turmoil since a popular uprising that erupted in 2011 ousted long-serving president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012.

Houthi control over the Yemeni capital seems to be opening the door for a sectarian Sunni-Shiite war inYemen.

Source:  albawaba.com

What does Hezbollah mean by 'painful concessions' in Syria? 

Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, told UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura last week that "painful concessions" will be required for a political solution in Syria.

De Mistura is visiting Lebanon, Russia, Turkey, Iran and other regional countries during what he described as a “very crucial period” for the Syrian political process.

The meeting with Qassem was the first by de Mistura in his capacity as UN envoy for Syria. Di Mistura’s predecessor, Lakhdar Brahmi, did not meet with Hezbollah officials in his capacity as UN/Arab League envoy.

According to Al-Monitor columnist Jean Aziz, “painful concessions refer to the [Syrian] regime’s acknowledgment of the opposition as a partner in governing and acknowledgement by the opposition and those supporting it that the current regime is their partner in Syria.”

Erdogan sets back Iran-Turkey ties

In an Oct. 13 speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashed out at Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, asking, “What kind of religious leader [Khamenei] is this [who] says ‘[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad is the only one challenging Israel’? Assad didn’t shoot a bullet at Israel. Assad killed 250,000, and you’re still supporting him, sending him money and arms.”

Ali Hashem writes that Erdogan’s remarks were a setback for what was considered to be a mild warming trend following the Turkish president’s visit to Tehran in January.

An Iranian official told Hashem, “The death of 250,000 in Syria was caused by nations that back the terrorists in Syria. Turkey is one of those states, and it has full responsibility for the situation today. Mr. Erdogan personally knows that Iran is innocent. Iran is helping a legitimate government restore control over its land and fight terrorists coming from around the globe to kill and terrorize civilians. ... This [speech] is another indication that Ankara isn’t really serious about cooperating to end the crisis in Syria. It’s such a shame that an essential country in the region is still not determined to fight terrorism, is hesitant to help its Kurdish neighbors in any way and at the same time is attacking those who warned of this end from the beginning.”

Despite Erdogan’s comments, and Iran’s off-the-record frustration with Turkey’s role in Syria, as reported by Hashem, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian took the diplomatic high road, saying on Oct. 24, “Iran welcomes any bilateral and regional cooperation with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Muslim countries in the region in a genuine and effective battle against terrorism and extremism.”

Erdogan points out US "mistake"

Criticizing the supreme leader of Iran may be one thing, but Erdogan also could not resist taking a swipe at the United States.

Erdogan’s remark on Oct. 22 that “the mistake can now be seen,” after a stray pallet from a US airdrop to Syrian Kurdish forces fell into IS hands, was taken as yet another sign, as if yet another sign as needed, that the United States and Turkey differ on the urgency of defeating the Islamic State (IS).

Semih Idiz reports that Erdogan’s decision to allow Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces passage to Syria has “caused controversy in Turkey. The military in particular is said to be unhappy about a corridor being opened for the peshmerga, especially after the recent agreement reached in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, between various Kurdish groups to join forces against IS. 

Sources close to the military told Al-Monitor that the Turkish armed forces continue to have a severe allergy to any military cooperation with Kurds, fearing that the PYD [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party] and the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] will ultimately benefit from it. The idea of an autonomous Kurdish entity along Turkey’s long border with Syria continues to also be anathema to the Turkish military.”

Both the United States and Turkey consider the PKK a terrorist organization.

Amberin Zaman writes that Erdogan’s approach to the US and international appeals to support Syrian Kurdish forces in the battle against IS over Kobani has been unnecessarily costly for Turkey:

“Turkey could have led the effort to support anti-IS forces in Kobani by letting arms and fighters through its borders weeks ago. This would have bolstered the peace process between Turkey and its own Kurds, while averting the public relations disaster caused by images of Turkish tanks and soldiers looking on as the Syrian Kurds battled IS in Kobani, thereby reinforcing claims that 'Turkey supports IS.'”

Zaman explains how the PYD outmaneuvered Erdogan and boxed in Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani (who also emerges as a possible winner, at least for now, for sending some peshemerga forces) to gain US and Western support for the PYD and its armed branch, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), in the battle for Kobani:

“The Kurds adeptly used the media and global public opinion — which depicted them as the region’s secular, pro-Western force, a space formerly occupied by Turkey — to draw the US into the battle for Kobani. The battle for Kobani then became a symbol of the contest between IS and the coalition, one that the US could no longer afford to lose. 

Moreover, the concentration of IS forces around Kobani allowed the US to inflict heavy losses on IS fighters. … Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani is probably unhappy about US engagement with the PYD/PKK, which he views as rivals. But, unlike Turkey, he has turned the situation to his own advantage by projecting himself as a benevolent leader who has aided fellow Kurds in their time of need.”

Jerusalem’s silent intifada

Ben Caspit writes that a silent intifada is brewing in Jerusalem. The potential for violence was on display when a Palestinian man from East Jerusalem drove his car into a crowd, killing a 3-month-old child Oct. 22; Israeli police shot the driver. Both Israelis and Palestinians demonstrated in response.

Caspit reports that Israel is seeking to quickly suppress this possible new intifada. He describes the "powder keg" that is Jerusalem, especially because any provocation can go soon be subsumed into the politics of the Temple Mount:

“Radicals from all sides are drawn to Jerusalem like a moth to a flame. On one side of the barricade are radical Jewish movements sanctifying the ascent of Jews for prayers on Temple Mount. On the other side of the barricade are radical Islamists who view the Temple Mount as the Muslim world’s “Holy of Holies” and they would not stand to see Jews in that area. Neither side is really in the right. Everyone sees the issue through their own subjective prism. Each side is yearning for a mega explosion and a massive fireball that they believe will hasten the 'Day of Judgment.' The Muslims believe that on that day God and his prophet Muhammad will scatter the Jews all over and put an end to the Zionist enterprise. Jews, on the other hand, believe that the Messiah will finally arrive and Muslims will be thrown into history’s dumpster. It’s a pity that only the radicals in these volatile places get to speak up, while the silent majority on both sides looks at them helplessly. ... 

"Calls have been made in Israel to quickly and harshly suppress this new intifada, no holds barred. Although this demand is justified, its execution, however, is perilous. The situation is a powder keg just waiting to explode all around us at any moment. And when it does, we will all look wistfully at the 'silent intifada.' For the gates of hell to open, all it takes is one unexpected incident on the Temple Mount that will spiral out of control, resulting in a few Palestinian fatalities. 

Israel understands that perfectly. Abbas, on the other hand, is slightly less apprehensive. In a pugnacious speech he delivered Oct. 17, in which he used harsh and unprecedented terms (as far as he is concerned) to describe Israel and its policy, he called on the Palestinians to rally in the defense of the Temple Mount. Abbas, too, is treading a very fine line here, poking the tiger. The last time this tiger was provoked and went wild, the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat tried riding on its back. We all know how that ended. So does Abbas. No one wants to go back to that ending. If things continue to unfold at the same rate as they do now, this ending will backlash at us, on its own initiative.”

Source: Al Monitor

Libya, thirty killed in Benghazi clashes

Fresh heavy fighting between pro-government forces and militants has claimed the lives of nearly 30 people in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi.

A Libyan army spokesperson said on Sunday the clashes have resulted in fierce exchanges of fire in different parts of Libya's second-largest city.

“A number of army units today broke into houses of militants suspected of violence in the city in the past few months," said Ahmad al-Mismari.

"The army has gone through fierce battles in different parts of the city, especially in the western entrance," al-Mismari added.

The latest casualties bring the death toll since the beginning of the military operations in mid-October to at least 170.

On Wednesday night, the Libyan military forces, backed by armed supporters of former General Khalifa Haftar, entered the flashpoint city of Benghazi for the first time in two months.

Spokesman for Libya's special forces Meloud al-Zewi said that though the new advances are a step forward in the liberation of Benghazi, there is still a long battle ahead of the Libyan army.

The new moves came after Libya’s internationally recognized Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani announced last week that the country’s army and its allied forces were ready to recapture the capital Tripoli and Benghazi.

Libya’s government and elected parliament moved to Tobruk after an armed group from Misrata seized Tripoli and most government institutions in August.

The new Tripoli rulers have set up a rival parliament and government not recognized by the international community.

Libya plunged into chaos following the 2011 uprising that toppled longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi. The ouster of Gaddafi gave rise to a patchwork of heavily-armed militias and deep political divisions.

The North African country has been witnessing numerous clashes between government forces and rival militia groups that refuse to lay down arms. The groups are now turning their guns on each other in an attempt to dominate politics and the country’s vast oil resources.

Source:  albawaba.com

 Lebanese Army suffers 11 deaths in ongoing battles with militants

The Lebanese Army has suffered at least 11 deaths since outbreak of fierce clashes with militant gunmen in northern Lebanon four days ago, according to latest official reports.

The reports indicated that precarious calm prevailed at the hot spots in the northern city of Tripoli early today, where the army troops continued to exchanging gunfire with the militants in various sectors. In the town of Bahnin, located some 10 km north of the city center, a soldier died and another suffered serious injuries during overnight clashes.

In Bab Al-Tebbaneh, a sector considered a main stronghold for the militants in the city, thousands of civilians were seen fleeing their homes against the background of gunfire blasts.

Tripoli and surrounding areas have witnessed recurring clashes between the government troops and gunmen, affiliated to the Syrian opposition. (and) wsm-tib.rk

Source:  kuna.net.kw

France moving troops toward Libyan border, monitoring al-Qaida linked militants

France is moving troops toward the Libyan border within weeks and, along with U.S. intelligence, is monitoring al-Qaida arms shipments to Africa's Sahel region, a top French military official said Thursday.

A French base will go up within weeks in a desert outpost 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the lawless Libyan border region overrun by Islamic militants, the official said on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly on the matter.

U.S. intelligence is helping French troops "a lot," he said.

Earlier this month, French troops destroyed an arms convoy in northern Niger carrying three tons of weapons from Libya to Mali. A French drone had located and followed the convoy from southeast Libya, the top defense official said.

About 50 French troops will be permanently based in northern Niger and they could be reinforced very quickly by the French and Niger military when necessary, in order to be "able to crisscross the zone up to the border and hamper as much as possible the traffic route", he said.

French and U.S. drones are already operating out of Niger's capital, Niamey.

France launched a military operation three months ago against Islamist groups, with troops and equipment sent to ex-colonies Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mali.

Following France's intervention to rout Islamic militants from Mali last year, the operation is aiming to counter al-Qaida-linked militants there, and their potential ties with Nigerian militant group Boko Haram.

Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned last month that Libya is a "hub for terrorists."

France's strategy "reflects the changing threat," said Francois Heisbourg, a French analyst at the Foundation for Strategic Research think tank in Paris. "That's the cost of the success: while (French and U.N. troops) managed to undermine the permanent establishment of terrorists in northern Mali ... they withdraw and went to northern Niger and southern Libya."

Source: AP

29 killed in Libyan violence

As many as 29 people have been killed in the Libyan city of Benghazi after units of the Libyan army, reinforced by armed supporters of retired Major General Khalifa Hafter, carried out raids targeting homes of Islamic militia leaders in the city, medical sources said. 

The raids and clashes in the western entry to Benghazi as well as sporadic violent clashes killed 29 people Thursday, raising the death toll in the city to at least 149 people within one week, Xinhua reported. 

“The center received on Thursday 19 bodies, including four unidentified and an officer of the brigade 204 tanks of the army, as well as an Islamist leader of Ansar al—Sharia,” a source at Benghazi Medical Center said. 

“The rest died as a result of injury in the clashes and in Ard Ezwawa and Bo—Dzera area, as well as executions out of the law and injuries by stray bullets,” the source added. 

“At least 10 were killed as a result of the clashes. Al—Kwefia hospital, specialised in respiratory diseases, received the bodies,” said another medical source. 

On Wednesday evening, 14 people were killed, while units of the army, backed by supporters of Haftar, progressed towards Hai Al— Salam, northeast of downtown Benghazi, for the first time since the start of the attack of Hafter in the city last Wednesday against Islamic militias. 

Haftar, who played a major role in toppling Libya’s former leader Muammar Gaddafi, has been waging a war on Benghazi’s Islamist armed groups since May. 

Libya has witnessed a drastic escalation of violence after the 2011 turmoil which toppled Gaddafi. 

The Islamist militants and pro— secular militia have been vying for cities and towns for months. Fighting still flares near Tripoli, Benghazi and Gharyan. 

Source:  thehindu.com