Islamic State and Nusra Front move toward alliance amid coalition strikes in Syria

Lo Stato Islamico sta tessendo un'alleanza con il Fronte Al-Nusra, il più grande affiliato di Al-Qaeda in Siria, contro una coalizione (guidata dagli Stati Uniti) che prosegue i bombardamenti contro le posizioni jihadiste.
 
Jabhat al-Nusra ha dovuto affrontare una crescente pressione dai propri membri per riconciliarsi con il suo rivale Stato Islamico e formare un fronte unito contro gli attacchi aerei, iniziati in Siria la scorsa settimana.

Joining forces with IS would require Nusra Front members to pledge loyalty to the group, which has declared a caliphate in territory it controls in those countries. This would effectively put an end to the Nusra Front, fighters in the group say.

Long one of the most effective forces fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad, Nusra Front was weakened this year by battles with Islamic State, an Al-Qaida splinter group that routinely employs ruthless methods such as beheadings and mass executions. The two share the same ideology and rigid Islamic beliefs, but fell out during a power struggle that pitted IS head Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi against Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahri and Nusra Front leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani.

But the U.S.-led air and missile strikes, which have hit Nusra Front as well as Islamic State bases in Syria, have angered many Nusra members who say the West and its allies have joined forces in a "crusader" campaign against Islam.

According to a report in The Guardian, Nusra Front units in north Syria have made peace with the Islamic State, and a senior source told the newspaper that leaders of both groups are holding war planning meetings, although they have yet to formally join forces.

Sources close to Islamic State told Reuters that some Nusra fighters were joining them after the strikes and there was a growing sense among many that it was time to put their differences aside.

Others think a formal merger is unlikely. "There are hardline voices inside Nusra who are pushing for reconciliation with Islamic State," a source close to Nusra's leadership said, though he doubted it would happen. "I know Golani. He would never reconcile with Islamic State. If he ever does it, it would be in a direct order from the leadership, and that is al-Zawahri himself."

However, one Islamic State fighter said he believed there was an "80 percent chance that the brothers of Nusra will join the State."

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based monitoring group, said on Friday over 200 fighters had joined Islamic State in the northern Aleppo area, many from the Nusra Front, since U.S. President Barack Obama said he was prepared to strike the group in Syria.

In an audio message posted on militant forums on Thursday, a senior Al-Qaida figure warned Muslims against joining Islamic State and called on fighters in Syria to "rescue the ship of jihad, and reach it before it deviates from its course."

The message from Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie al Bahtiyti told fighters in Syria to avoid infighting and fanaticism, the SITE monitoring service said.

No trust
Even before the air strikes, Nusra Front was losing fighters to Islamic State, which is seen as more organized and determined to impose Islamic rule.

"This goes without saying, this is a crusader war that includes all infidel nations against the Islamic State," said Nusra Front commander Abu Mussab al-Makdessi in a voice message posted in jihadi forums online in response to a question from an Islamist about the group's reaction to the strikes.

"Regardless of what happened between us, they remain our brothers, and the ideological bond between us is stronger than anything. We are ready to fight by their side ... our blood is their blood."

One former Nusra fighter inside Syria said the air strikes had strengthened Islamic State's position even further. "Nusra is in a very difficult situation. I think now it should just announce the end of itself. Zawahri has to be brave," he told Reuters. "It is no longer like the old days. He needs to understand this. This is a new era with a caliph," he said.

Source: Haaretz

Intervento in Siria-Iraq: un precedente per la Libia?

All’Assemblea delle Nazioni Unite tenutasi a New York nei giorni scorsi, gran parte dell’attenzione negli interventi dei capi di governo che si sono alternati sul palco è stata dedicata alla minaccia jihadista e all’intervento internazionale contro lo Stato Islamico (IS). 

Ma lo stato islamico non costituisce l’unica minaccia presente nell’area. In Libia, negli ultimi mesi, gran parte del territorio della Cirenaica, l’est del paese, è caduto sotto il controllo di formazioni dichiaratamente jihadiste, in particolare di Ansar al-Sharia. 

Parte della comunità internazionale si sta chiedendo quindi se l’intervento contro IS non possa costituire un precedente per intervenire militarmente in Libia. 

Il paese vive ormai una situazione di anarchia: fazioni di varia astrazione controllano il territorio; le milizie di Misurata, legate alla Fratellanza musulmana, e quelle di Zintan, vicine al partito più secolarista di Mahmud Jibril, continuano a fronteggiarsi in Tripolitania; un generale rinnegato Khalifa Haftar cerca di riprendere il controllo dell’area di Bengasi; il nuovo parlamento eletto nelle ultime elezioni di giugno, e riconosciuto come legittimo dalla comunità internazionale, si è rifugiato a Tobruk, quasi sotto protezione egiziana, mentre le forze islamiste hanno riconvocato il vecchio parlamento a Tripoli, minacciando il pieno controllo della Banca centrale e dei ministeri. 

Si sta creando un consenso politico internazionale sulla Libia?

Nelle ultime settimane a Madrid si è tenuta un’importante conferenza delle potenze regionali coinvolte in Libia. Le conclusioni sembrano aver escluso un eventuale intervento militare straniero ribadendo invece la necessità di “riprendere il dialogo tra le fazioni libiche, ad eccezione di quelle armate”. Anche a New York sono stati compiuti passi importanti per cercare un'unità di intenti della comunità internazionale. Il dipartimento di Stato americano ha organizzato un incontro per discutere sul futuro della Libia, a cui hanno partecipato anche l’Egitto e gli Emirati Arabi Uniti, accusati di avere bombardato alcune postazioni islamiste nelle scorse settimane, il Qatar e la Turchia, accusate invece di aiutare gli islamisti. L’incontro si è concluso con un comunicato congiunto per chiedere di cessare le ostilità ed iniziare un dialogo nazionale tra i diversi gruppi. Secondo Arturo Varvelli, Research Fellow dell'ISPI, “questa è l’ultima possibilità per una soluzione pacifica del conflitto in Libia”.

Cosa è Ansar Al-Sharia?

Il Gruppo è stato creato nel 2012 da ex appartenenti a brigate islamiste che avevano combattuto Gheddafi nel 2011. Come spiega Dario Cristiani per ISPI, questo gruppo è attivo soprattutto nella zona di Bengasi e della Cirenaica e combatte contro il tentativo delle truppe fedeli ad Haftar di riconquistare questi territori. È un'organizzazione islamista che opera sia come un classico gruppo terroristico (è accusata dell’omicidio dell’ambasciatore Usa Christopher Stevens) sia tramite assistenza territoriale in sostituzione dello stato libico assente. Eppure non mancano gli indizi di una collaborazione tra Ansar Al Sharia e i gruppi più importanti del terrorismo internazionale. Come spiega Mawassi Lahcen dopo la rottura tra i gruppi di Al Qaeda e l’IS, Al Baghdadi sta cercando di convincere Ansar-Al Sharia a giurare fedeltà al “Califfato”. L’obiettivo è di ottenere un alleato anche in questo territorio, dopo che lo scontro con Al Zawairi ha determinato un allontanamento di Al-Qaeda nel Maghreb dallo Stato Islamico. Ci sono segnali che una limitata collaborazione tra i militanti di IS e Ansar Al Sharia sia già iniziata, nonostante manchi l’approvazione ufficiale dei leader. Sembra che la brigata Al-Battar, composta completamente da ex combattenti libici in IS, stia già operando nella città libica Derna. Questa città è storicamente una delle roccaforti di Ansar Al Sharia e perciò la presenza di questi combattenti “di ritorno” non può che destare più di qualche preoccupazione sui legami tra questo gruppo e l’IS.

La Francia verso un nuovo intervento in Libia?

Intervenendo alle Nazioni Unite il ministro degli esteri francese Laurent Fabius ha accennato alla necessità di risolvere militarmente la minaccia jihadista nell’est e nel sud della Libia. Fabius ha dichiarato che questi gruppi non potranno essere neutralizzati solamente attraverso il processo di riconciliazione nazionale ma che è realistico pensare ad un intervento. Pochi giorni prima il ministro della Difesa francese Jean-Yves Le Drian era stato ancora più esplicito parlando della necessità di un intervento armato contro le forze terroristiche. L’Italia, pur evidenziando ad ogni occasione internazionale la necessità di una azione coordinata in Libia da parte della comunità internazionale, non ha mai menzionato un’azione militare, limitandosi a richieste di azioni politiche. Renzi ieri ha invitato l’assemblea Onu “a sostenere con determinazione l’avvio di un processo di riconciliazione nazionale, inclusivo e consensuale”.

Che tipologia di intervento?

Alcuni analisti internazionali esperti di Libia si limitano a consigliare un intervento di carattere politico nel paese. Frederick Wehrey del Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pone l’enfasi sulla necessità di implementare un piano concordato con gli attori regionali per una transizione pacifica e di continuare la collaborazione con il governo riconosciuto sull’addestramento di forze militari. Altri hanno pensato ad un intervento militare finalizzato però a contenere e limitare gli scontri tra fazioni. Karim Mezran dell’Atlantic Council sottolinea come l’intervento esterno, sia esso politico o militare, dovrebbe avere una caratterizzazione di neutralità e la finalità di una riconciliazione inclusiva. Wolfgang Pusztai, analista austriaco ed ex-attaché militare in Libia, ha delineato per ISPI l’opportunità e le caratteristiche che potrebbe avere un intervento di peacekeeping nel paese.

Source: ISPI

How Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from the Islamic State

Tredici anni dopo che il presidente americano George W. Bush ha dichiarato guerra al terrorismo, questo sembra essersi trasformato in una bestia ancora più pericolosa nella forma dello Stato islamico (IS).

I paesi occidentali sembrano essere sotto la stessa cappa di paura e incertezza come dopo l'11 settembre 2001. Come Al Qaeda, il movimento jihadista sunnita dell'IS è legato al marchio wahhabita dell'Islam proveniente dall'Arabia Saudita. Questo "legame" ha provocato un rinnovato dibattito tra sauditi su questa presunta connessione wahabismo-jihadismo.

After bombings in Riyadh by al-Qaeda in 2003, the relationship between terrorism and religious extremism was widely discussed in the kingdom, with the government establishing the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue that same year. During the dialogue's second meeting, Extremism and Moderation … A Comprehensive Methodological Vision, it was agreed that religious programs in Saudi Arabia were the primary force behind the spread of extremism in society. As a result of the dialogue, school curricula, the religious curriculum in particular, were modified by the Ministry of Education. Doubts remained, however, that religious education had been sufficiently modified given that radical Islamists were believed to dominate the education sector in the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is today taking seriously the allegations in the international media that it is the ideological root of the current jihadist groups. Some have sought to defend the country's religious vision by trying to disassociate Sunni jihadist groups from their brand of Islam, instead castigating other groups, such as the Kharijites — an Islamic sect separate from Sunnis and Shiites that emerged from the first Islamic civil war in the seventh century between Ali Ibn Ali Talib and Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan following the killing of the third caliph, Uthman Ibn Affan.

Nawaf Obaid and Saud al-Sarhan presented this view in a Sept. 8 article in The New York Times. They argued that IS' discourse is different from that of Salafism and Wahhabism. They contended that IS ideologues are Kharijites who believe that those different from them are infidels and can therefore rightfully be killed, including en masse.

The main problem in suggesting an IS link to Kharijites is that the group has been distributing Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s books across the territory under its control in Iraq and Syria, suggesting that the group is explicitly declaring its affiliation with Wahhabism. Another issue is that the religious basis of Sunni jihadist movements is completely different from Kharijism, which eventually developed different schools of jurisprudence. One of the most prominent schools is Ibadism, the official confession in Oman, which is not linked to IS in any way.

In debates about terrorism and extremism in Saudi Arabia, extremism is repeatedly attributed to the era of Juhayman Ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaybi, who in 1979 led extremists to take over the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The government at the time met the radicals’ demands and allowed them to implement their brand of conservatism through the media, education and other forms of public life. This era in Saudi history is called the Awakening, and Wahhabism at the time was not described as a source of extremism. Today, however, because of IS, there are discussions on the connection between Sunni jihadist extremism and Wahhabism inside and outside Saudi Arabia. This might eventually change the way Saudis see themselves.

These discussions have always stirred political and religious sensitivities, as the kingdom has openly declared that it adopted the movement of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This is reflected in the religious activities funded by Saudi Arabia around the world and in the discourse of most of its religious scholars. The political sensitivities arise given that the first signs of the Saudi state emerged when Abd al-Wahhab joined forces with Imam Muhammad Bin Saud in the 18th century. This alliance holds symbolic importance to the religious and political union in Saudi history, as legitimacy was accorded by the religious movement to establish the modern-day state of Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom’s participation in the first airstrikes against IS in Syria on Sept. 23 demonstrates its seriousness in combating the radicals. This followed a recent shift in Saudi policy to focus on the threat posed by Sunni jihadist groups. King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz expressed disappointment toward the international community on Aug. 1 for not showing enthusiasm for the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), begun in 2011 with Saudi backing. He also donated $100 million to the center, while the grand mufti, Abdul Aziz Al al-Sheikh, proclaimed IS the No. 1 threat to Islam.

Some see the kingdom’s efforts to fight terrorism simply as a way to deflect criticism from Western governments. On Aug. 28 in the Washington Post, David Ignatius wrote that Saudi support for the UNCCT and the identification of IS as the main enemy of Islam were done to avoid criticism being leveled against Saudi Arabia for backing Sunni extremism. This view, however, ignores that terrorism poses a direct threat to Saudi Arabia.

Despite attempts by some prominent Saudis to do so, it is difficult to link IS to Kharijites and separate the group from Wahhabism, as the group has explicitly adopted the ideas of Abd al-Wahab and is spreading and imposing them on the regions it controls. The current challenge is to prove that the ideas of Wahhabism are the primary reason for the creation and mobilization of jihadist organizations and is not a distraction from the political collapse of the region as the facilitator of the growth in extremism.

Source:  al-monitor

States at U.N. say ready to help Libya combat Islamist militants

I paesi occidentali e diversi stati arabi hanno espresso la propria volontà di aiutare, anche militarmente, il legittimo governo della Libia nel combattere le numese milizie e le formazioni islamiche che stanno dilaniando il paese mediterraneo da anni.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened a high-level meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the conflict in Libya, which is suffering its worst violence since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

"The meeting recognized the lead role of the government of Libya in addressing the growing threat of terrorist groups, and the readiness to support the government in this regard," said a chairman's summary of the meeting.

Among the countries represented were France, Britain, the United states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and Russia, which has repeatedly condemned the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, often citing it as a reason for its refusal to allow U.N. sanctions and other measures against its long time ally Syria.

Since the fall of Gaddafi, Libya's government has been unable to control rival militias of heavily armed former rebels, who once fought against Gaddafi but now refuse to disarm and count on semi-official support from ministries or politicians.

Libya is now divided. The government and elected parliament have relocated to Tobruk in the far east since losing control of the capital, Tripoli, where a rival government has been created by forces from the western city of Misrata.

Western countries are particularly concerned by the presence of Islamist militant group Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, which the United States blames for killing its ambassador and three other Americans in 2012 and classifies as a terrorist organization.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told the meeting on Thursday that the group should be placed under U.N. sanctions.

"The efforts that are being used to fight Daesh (Islamic State) to limit the movements of foreign fighters and financing should also be used for these groups," Fabius said, referring to the militant group that has seized swaths of Syria and Iraq.

He said reconciliation alone would not neutralize Ansar al-Sharia and similar groups.

"We know there are groups on the south and east of Libya, and these, let's be realistic, will not be automatically neutralized just because, as we hope, there is a reconciliation in Libya," Fabius said.

"Of course the reconciliation is necessary but if we want Libyan forces to do what is necessary towards these terrorist groups, they need to be united," he said. "But we all know that other measures will need to be taken."

Mysterious airstrikes targeted Islamist militants from the western city of Misrata, conquering Tripoli last month. U.S. officials have said that the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, two countries worried by the spread of such groups in Libya, were responsible for the strikes.

Source:  in.news.yahoo.com

The "Khurasan Group": A Misleading Name in the Politics of War

Negli ultimi due giorni Washington ha riferito del "Gruppo Khorasan," una cellula terroristica in Siria che stava approntando un attacco contro un bersaglio occidentale non specificato. Khorasan, un nome che sembrava venire dal nulla, con gli Stati Uniti che hanno rivendicato un attacco aereo vittorioso contro un gruppo del quale nessuno aveva mai sentito parlare prima.

La verità, tuttavia, è che praticamente tutti, in tutto il mondo, hanno sentito parlare di questo gruppo, più probabilmente con un altro nome: al-Qaeda (AQ).

Understanding the Khurasan Group
The "Khurasan" in "Khurasan Group" refers to the Afghanistan/Pakistan area―an older Islamic term designated to the region and used by jihadists just the same as "Shaam" for Syria or "Bilad al-Rafadayen [the country of the two rivers]" for Iraq. Since AQ grew in the last decade with branching subgroups, some are also identified by their historic location names, such as al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as a reference to the Western north Africa.

We're all familiar with AQ as being present in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area for at least two decades now. The region has housed such senior operatives as late AQ leader Osama bin Laden and current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Thus, to differentiate between the various AQ branches and locations, jihadists often refer to AQ leadership as "The Khurasan leadership" or "the brothers in Khurasan," rather than using the name "al-Qaeda central."

In recent years, amid the extremist vacuum created by the Syrian Civil War, AQ operatives and leaders from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region were dispatched to Syria to assist and form AQ's relatively new branch there, al-Nusra Front. Here, the "Khurasan Group" has essentially operated alongside al-Nusra Front as a co-AQ affiliate since at least 2011.

Prominent members of AQ's "Khurasan Group" have included well-known AQ operatives and trainers such as Abdullah Suleiman Salih al-Dhabah (AKA Abu Ali al-Qasimi), a tacked name on Saudi Arabia's list of most-wanted AQ members who arrived in Syria as early as 2011. This list also includes top al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), including their top leader, Nasser al-Wahayshi. As reported by SITE, al-Dhabah was killed in Syria in January of this year. Also among the leaders is Abdulmuhassan Abdullah Ibrahim al-Sharj (AKA Sanafi al-Nasr), another wanted Saudi AQ affiliate and recruiter who moved with the group to Syria from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area.

Other prominent members include long-time AQ financier Muhsin al-Fadhli, another name on the Saudi most-wanted list who was purportedly killed in recent U.S. airstrikes in Syria between September 22 and 23; and "Abu Yousuf al-Turki," a AQ senior operative dispatched to Syria and considered among the best AQ snipers and trainers. Since his arrival to Syria, al-Turki served as a commander with the Nusra Front.
It should be noted that these men with the "Khurasan Group," acting as AQ operatives in Syria, did not attempt to hide their presence in the region. Some of them were even active on Twitter. For instance, when al-Dhabah was killed in January 2013, it was al-Nasr who tweeted about it and provided a photo to his 23,000+ followers. He stated:

#Martyrdom_Abu_Ali_alQasimi [Dahab] the lion fighter, one of the wanted in the 47 list, may Allah rest his soil, got injured in Afghanistan but his end was in al-Sham

Al-Nasr's Twitter page constantly tweets the group's activities in Syria with the Nusra Front. He has even reported about his discussions with IS leadership in attempt to try resolving the problems between the groups.

The connections between these AQ operatives and the Nusra Front were publicly stated many times. On December 18, 2013, al-Nasr wrote about Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, the head of Nusra Front, "Joulani represents me. May Allah protect him."

Al-Nasr shown alive.Though al-Nasr was reported to be dead by some jihadists in March 2014, later reports in April showed him alive in Syria, claiming that previous announcements of his death were for "security reasons." His last tweet was made less than a week ago on September 18.

Al-Nasr is not the only one from the group to openly communicate to followers through Twitter. Even the slain leader, al-Dhabah, had a Twitter page. His last tweet was made on January 17, 2014, a day before his reported death. Throughout his tweets, he repeated his pledge to Zawahiri, his experiences with jihad, and suggestions to the fighters in Syria. On January 13, four days before his death, he tweeted:

Advice to the Muhajireen in Syria, teach your women to use arms like the Kalashnikovs and guns and hand grenades and the application should be practical so as to break the fear of arms with them.

Al-Dhabah even tweeted inspired calls for women in Syria to become more involved in the fight:

Allah is great, one of the Muhajireen women in Syria wears an explosive belt and saying that if the Sahwaat enter upon us I will pull it against them. The Muhajireen [immigrant] women are a red line, you dirty Sahwaat.

Regardless of whether we reference them as the Khurasan Group or any other name, there is no doubt that these and other AQ operatives and leaders who moved from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region remain just as much a part of AQ as ever.

Also important to note is that AQ attempts to attack Americans and American targets more than any other jihadi group. And, being in Syria along with al-Nusra Front, the group has obtained further access for everything that takes to prepare attacks: explosives, men (Americans), training camps, and the expertise.

Why the Renaming?
Knowing these details, the name "Khurasan Group" begins to beg questions. Why did the Obama administration create a new name? Why not simply call the group AQ? Is the AQ name no longer sufficient to credit attacks?

There is more than one reason for the renaming.
For one, the U.S. government's naming of this cell of jihadist heavyweights as the "Khurasan Group" is an attempt to distance the group from AQ—even though that is precisely what the group is.
One of the Obama Administration's key foreign policy bragging points has been that "al-Qaeda has been decimated." However, the existence of this AQ haven in Syria—allegedly nearing the final stages of a Western-aimed attack—pokes a sizable hole in this assertion.

AQ's exploits in Syria have been lost in the dominating buzz surrounding IS as well as the chaotic bed of other rebel groups in the region. By labeling this cell as the "Khurasan Group," a name that would expectedly seem obscure to many Westerners, AQ's thriving presence in Syria is effectively dumped into a confusing sea of remaining groups and subgroups.

Statements from Washington reflect this rhetorical maneuver. In his recent speech on September 10, President Obama made 20 references to IS (referring to the group as ISIL), and zero mentions of al-Nusra Front. More, the president's only mentions of AQ were made as part of initial claims of targeting leaders and affiliates in Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, and then of the group's former affiliation with IS.
Washington's labeling diversion is not only purposed for Americans. Currently, the U.S. government is working to maintain a coalition not only of Western nations, but also of Arab allies such as Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. Such cooperation has been easier to achieve now than it was a decade ago—particularly due to a mutual distaste for IS. AQ, however, still draws widespread support across the region, making it a tricky element in the mix.

Attempting to counter Iranian Shi'a expansions in Syria from one hand, and worried about the growing strength of IS, Gulf countries comprise a large amount of Nusra Front funding and support. For instance, figures like Sheikh Shafi Al-Ajami, a prominent member Kuwait's parliament, has openly found a venue on Kuwaiti state television to fundraise AQ-affiliated military operations in Syria. On May 25, 2013, Ajami was able to state that "we bought, and will continue buying" weapons for Mujahideen fighters in Syria, and even followed up with a "weapons wish list" consisting of heat-seeking missile, guided rockets, armor piercing shells, and anti-aircraft machine gun—all with their respective prices.

So, while the Obama Administration balances a delicate coalition of Arab nations, attacks on AQ will likely continue to be swept under the carpet—or at least labeled otherwise. In the meantime, the American public and media should not take every name and operation they hear at face value as the politics of war are often, by their very nature, misleading.

Source:  siteintelgroup.com

Four reasons Hezbollah is concerned by Syrian militants

Fonti vicine a Hezbollah hanno riferito che l'organizzazione sciita sta esprimendo una crescente preoccupazione per le ripetute infiltrazioni di siriani armati dalla Siria verso la valle della Bekaa occidentale, nell'angolo sud-orientale del Libano.  

Questa regione, che costituisce un triangolo di confine tra il Libano, l'est della Siria e il nord di Israele, ha visto in questi ultimi giorni scontri ricorrenti fra le milizie sciite, l'esercito libanese e gli infiltrati siriani....
Official security forces have managed twice within the past few weeks, on July 3 and on Aug. 28, to arrest a number of these armed militants. However, many questions hang over other cases of infiltration, which have yet to be controlled by Lebanese security forces. Some of these questions are about the number of Sunni fundamentalists who have crossed the border from Syria into Lebanon in the western Bekaa Valley.

The same sources explain that Hezbollah has concerns about this phenomenon for several reasons.

First, in the most simplistic approach, this new border gap has given access for armed Syrians affiliated with Sunni fundamentalist or terrorist organizations to come into Lebanon. This gap is added to the great breaches taking place in the northeastern corner of Lebanon, in the region of Arsal.

The mere mention of this fact suggests the risk that this southern corner — similarly to the northern one — is a ticking bomb that could explode at any moment, whether in clashes with the Lebanese army as happened in Arsal, or with Hezbollah fighters directly. The infiltration into Arsal led to a fierce battle between Sunni fundamentalist militants, affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Lebanese army on Aug. 2.

The situation in this area is also a ticking bomb, as a number of Lebanese soldiers have been kidnapped by militants, two of them were beheaded and the third was also executed, while the rest were threatened with death. The last victim was a Shiite soldier belonging to a large Shiite clan from the Bekaa Valley, which could portend sectarian retaliatory actions in the eastern areas of Lebanon. What if another new battle with all the explosive ingredients were added to the open battlefield?

Second, as in the case of Arsal, the infiltrating armed Syrians belonging to Sunni terrorist organizations are mostly headed toward Lebanese territories with a Sunni majority. This would provide these militants with a certain level of protection, since the Syrian areas adjoining the Lebanese Shiite-dominant areas have failed in opening sustainable gaps on the border. On the contrary, these gaps were permanently closed after military clashes with armed militants — which Hezbollah had settled to its advantage — as was the case in the Syrian city of Qusair on June 5, 2013. However, now this settlement seems impossible as the infiltrating militants have been heading to Sunni areas in Lebanon for more than two years, similar to the what happened in Arsal, and as it is feared today in the western Bekaa Valley.

Third, this region is particularly vulnerable, as it is adjacent to the border with Israel, which would place Hezbollah in a more delicate position. What if these militants turned their guns to the south, firing rockets to Israel and provoking clashes, which has occurred many times in the past few weeks?

This could spur Israel into action; this situation has so far been under control, but could at any time spell doom if the gap gets wider on the entire southern Lebanese border. Hezbollah would be caught between fires: either clashing with the Israeli army at a bad time not of Hezbollah's choosing, or targeting the militants, and thus appearing to be protecting the border with Israel.

Fourth, there is another threat resulting from the infiltration in the southeastern corner of Lebanon. Sunni fundamentalists coming from the Syrian regions of Daraa and Houran would be in direct contact with Shiite regions in southern Lebanon. They could also threaten to form a Sunni fundamentalist hotbed with the militants from Arsal, wrapping around the Shiite Bekaa Valley, amid the peak of the Sunni-Shiite tension along the border between Syria and Lebanon, and inside Lebanon itself.

Thus, the infiltration of Syrian militants not only threatens to trigger a potential clash with Israel, but also to incite Sunni-Shiite strife in very critical Lebanese areas, which are, first, adjacent to Israel and, second, constitute a strategic stronghold for Hezbollah.

All this may be behind the increased infiltration, especially in light of what is happening in Syria, from Quneitra to the Golan Heights. This causes concerns for Hezbollah, and calls for more than just shedding light on it.

Source: al-monitor.com

New US Jet Fighter Striking Inside Syria

The U.S. airstrikes this week against Islamic State militants in Syria marked the first time that the Pentagon has deployed its new F-22 Raptors into combat, the Defense Department acknowledged on Tuesday.
The Raptor is a fifth-generation aircraft that’s reportedly capable of destroying targets from 15 miles away with precision bombs.

http://www.westernjournalism.com/boom-watch-this-video-of-first-ever-military-use-of-new-us-jet-fighter-striking-inside-syria/

Jihadists respond to U.S. aerial attacks in Syria, call by Twitter for retaliatory attacks

In risposta ai raid aerei effettuati dagli USA e da cinque stati arabi alleati nella coalizione contro obiettivi dello Stato islamico (IS) e di al-Nusra, i jihadisti hanno inondato i social media (in particolare Twitter) condannando gli attacchi, lanciando un appello all'unità jihadista nella regione, e diffondendo minacce verso gli Stati Uniti e i paesi alleati .

A common talking point among jihadist and jihadist-supporting Twitter accounts has been that the U.S. and the West has declared war on Islam. The account of Dutch jihadist "Israfil Yilmaz" referred to the attacks as being delivered by "cowards from the sky" and followed up, "This is like Ive said before not just a war on State, but a war on Islam, a war on the Muslims of Syria and Iraq."

The account of Rayat al-Tawheed, a media group of IS-supporting Western fighters in Syria, echoed the same message, tweeting, "The attacks are not just on IS but an attack on Islam."

In the same tweet, Rayat al-Tawheed followed up with another prevailing concern among jihadist accounts, stating that the U.S. offensive "will unite the ranks and we will seek one of the two victories."
Turkish user "Ahmed ibni Hasan," made multiple tweets to the same point, stating:

There is good in all evil. Allah willing the attacks of the infidel coalition will bring peace among the believers in on front, and Allah willing they will fight for the cause of Allah!

Following this message, the user then tweeted:

Somebody has to interfere and have Al-Nusra and the Islamic State make peace. No Muslim should die because of anyone’s conceit!

Tweets making the same call for unity even addressed numerous Arab nations' support for America. User "Ibn Ahmed" tweeted:

US alongside their Arab nations started campaign against IS 'positions' in Syria.. if this doesn't unite AQ/IS nothing will

One jihadist, explained to be a fighter with al-Nusra Front, appeared in a video showing a building—allegedly an al-Nusra front headquarters—destroyed by U.S. airstrikes. In the video, titled "Verklaring Jagbhat al-Nusra," he states that "many brothers died" and "got wounded." He followed up, "Although things like this happen to us, we will keep on fighting the enemies."

Other jihadist or jihadist-supporting accounts took a more aggressive tone to respond to the airstrikes, some implying or even directly calling for retaliation toward America. Rayat al-Tawheed, for example, tweeted:

We urge the brothers to carry out attacks on US soil. The fight against them is not just in Syria or Iraq. Slay them where you find them

Others tweets made the same threats to a snarkier note, with one user, "Abu Rayan #IS," tweeting:

Roses are red,
Violets are blue,
#IS is coming,
To a town near you. :)

Jihadists expressed similar anger toward Saudi Arabia, which has openly declared support for attacks on IS by America. In an Arabic tweet, user 'Al-Shaheedah# al-Khilafah" stated that if someone would provide him/her with a "bombed truck," she/he would "pound airport of Tabuuk or any airport where their aircrafts take off from it."

Another Arabic-writing user called for Muslims in Saudia Arabia to attack within its borders. The user, "Al-Jihad," tweeted:

Where are men of the Two Holy Mosques country, your women have been imprisoned, tortured, and now are racing to request the bombed cars,
May your mothers lose you; go forth towards a paradise wide as much as heavens and the Earth.

Source:  siteintelgroup.com

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfYanI-zJes

#NotInMyName: Young British Muslims at Active Change Foundation show their solidarity against ISIS and their actions. See how a simple message can be shared to show how ISIS is misrepresenting Islam.

UN proposes Libyan ceasefire and talks

L'ONU, l'Unione Europea e un gruppo di 13 nazioni hanno chiesto "un immediato cessate il fuoco globale" in Libia, dopo la missione delle Nazioni Unite che ha proposto - con inizio per la settimana prossima - colloqui tra i sostenitori dei due parlamenti libici rivali.

In a joint statement, the group on Monday said that rivals must "accept an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire,"  and "engage constructively in a peaceful political dialogue. There is no military solution to this conflict."

The group of nations includes Egypt and the UAE, which were accused in August of launching and supporting air raids against militias controlling the Libyan capital Tripoli.

The call comes after the UN support mission in Libya, UNSMIL, proposed that backers of rival governments in Libya hold talks in Algeria - the first such negotiations since a surge of violence that began in May.

The UN mission said a joint Libya-UN committee would oversee any ceasefire, and urged rivals to agree a timeline to withdraw fighters from cities and key installations including airports.

The talks were proposed to start on September 29, the UN mission said.

Libya's political scene is split between the Islamist-backed General National Congress in Tripoli, and its rival House of Representatives, which despite being internationally-backed is based on a converted car ferry in the port city of Tobruk.

The House of Representatives moved to Tobruk after fighters from 'Libya Dawn' took control of the capital and revived the GNC, which the House of Representatives was meant to replace after elections earlier this year.

The UN mission also called on militias in control of Tripoli to recognise the Tobruk parliament, saying the talks would be based on the "legitimacy of the elected institutions" and that they would also set the venue and date for a "handover ceremony'' from the previous parliament to the one elected earlier this year.

Source:  aljazeera.com

Iran e Arabia Saudita: verso la fine della guerra per procura?

Nelle ultime settimane, vari segnali lanciati da Teheran e Riyad hanno alimentato le ipotesi su una potenziale distensione tra i due paesi: l’obiettivo sarebbe contrastare la minaccia presentata dallo Stato Islamico (IS), il gruppo radicale sunnita che dal giugno scorso ha fortemente destabilizzato l’Iraq e la regione circostante.

A seguito della caduta di Mosul all’inizio di giugno e del consolidamento di IS in Iraq ed in Siria, il governo iraniano ha intrapreso una serie di iniziative volte a creare un rapporto strategico bilaterale con l’Arabia Saudita. Il 17 agosto, Teheran ha inviato un nuovo ambasciatore a Riyad, rimpiazzando il diplomatico in carica con Hossein Sadeghi: è un personaggio molto noto ed apprezzato dai sauditi, dato il suo precedente mandato come ambasciatore durante la presidenza (relativamente riformista) di Mohammad Khatami, tra il 1997 ed 2005.

Il 26 agosto, l’assistente del ministero degli Esteri Hussein Amir Abdul Lahian ha visitato l’Arabia Saudita, per discutere, tra le altre cose, la posizione delle due parti sulla formazione del nuovo governo iracheno all’indomani dell’uscita di scena del primo ministro Nouri al-Maliki, che era stato precedentemente sostenuto da Teheran. A inizio settembre, il viceministro degli Esteri (con delega per gli affari dell’Africa e dei paesi arabi), Hossein mir Abdollahian, ha fatto visita a Riyad al Principe Saud al Faisal, ministro degli Esteri saudita: si tratta dell’incontro di più alto rango tenutosi tra i due paesi dall’inizio del mandato di Hassan Rouhani nell’agosto 2013. In base a quanto sostenuto da Abdollahian, l’incontro si è tenuto in un clima molto “positivo e costruttivo” ed ha avuto come tematica centrale “questioni di comune interesse”, ovvero la situazione in Iraq e possibili strumenti per combattere l’estremismo ed il terrorismo nella regione.

Il Principe Saud ha esteso l’invito a visitare Riyad alla sua controparte iraniana, Mohammad Javad Zarif, che si è a sua volta detto pronto a ricevere il rappresentante saudita nella capitale iraniana. Il 31 agosto, in una conferenza stampa, Zarif ha affermato che l’“Iran è sempre intenzionato a stabilire buone relazioni con i paesi vicini e l’Arabia Saudita è il più importante di questi stati, data la sua rilevanza per il mondo islamico e la sua influenza”. Zarif ed il Principe Saud si sono incontrati per la  prima volta a margine dell’annuale Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, e hanno dichiarato che l’incontro costituisce la prima pagina di un nuovo capitolo nelle relazioni tra i due paesi, finalizzato a ripristinare la pace e la sicurezza nella regione.

Il presidente Rouhani aveva già tentato di dare una svolta alle relazioni con l’Arabia Saudita nel giugno 2013, durante la sua campagna elettorale: promuovendo un programma di politica estera volto al miglioramento dei rapporti con la comunità internazionale e con i paesi della regione, aveva sottolineato la necessità di dialogare con i sauditi. Nonostante l’ostilità reciproca degli ultimi anni, il Re Abdullah ha recepito in maniera positiva il messaggio di Rouhani, almeno formalmente, estendendo le sue congratulazioni al nuovo presidente iraniano. Tuttavia, di fatto i rapporti tra Iran ed Arabia Saudita non sono cambiati. Mentre Rouhani ed il suo gabinetto sono riusciti ad intensificare le relazioni con gli altri quattro paesi del Golfo, con numerose visite in Oman, Kuwait, Emirati Arabi Uniti e Qatar, lo stesso non si può dire per l’Arabia Saudita (e per il Bahrein, strettamente allineato con Riyad).

L’astio della Repubblica islamica nei confronti della monarchia saudita è endemico sin dai tempi della rivoluzione del 1979, in seguito alla quale Teheran identificò Riyad come un’alleata del Grande Satana, gli Stati Uniti. Il maggiore paese arabo della regione è stato anche visto come il bastione dell’Islam sunnita e di conseguenza come un rivale naturale. Con la morte dell’Ayatollah Khomeini nel 1989, le relazioni diplomatiche sono leggermente migliorate, dando modo alle varie amministrazioni che si sono succedute di avere un limitato margine di manovra nel determinare il loro approccio nei confronti dell’Arabia Saudita. Il periodo tra il 1997 ed il 2003, durante il governo riformista di Khatami, ha costituito l’apice del tentativo di riappacificazione tra i due paesi.

Le buone relazioni personali tra il presidente iraniano e l’attuale re saudita, e una graduale convergenza su alcuni elementi degli assetti di sicurezza della regione hanno portato ad uno storico accordo siglato nel 2001 per la cooperazione contro il terrorismo, il contrabbando di droga ed il riciclaggio di denaro. Al contrario, gli otto anni di governo Ahmadinejad hanno rappresentato il periodo più dannoso e caratterizzato da maggiore sfiducia ed ostilità tra Teheran e Riyad. Questo soprattutto dal 2011, quando lo scoppio della crisi siriana ha portando l’Iran a sostenere il presidente Bashar al-Assad, e l’Arabia Saudita a supportare i gruppi ribelli, alimentando la rivalità tra i due paesi e portandoli ad un conflitto indiretto tramite una guerra per procura nella regione.

Nonostante la minaccia presentata da IS abbia parzialmente riavvicinato Teheran e Riyad al momento e pur considerando che tale minaccia sembra costituire la priorità per entrambe, date le dinamiche regionali e la lunga rivalità, sembra pertanto difficile ipotizzare una cooperazione di lungo termine e di ampia natura tra le due capitali. Nonostante il temporaneo attenuamento del conflitto per procura tra Iran ed Arabia Saudita nei paesi della regione, i due si trovano su fronti opposti non solo in Siria, ma anche in Libano, Yemen e Bahrein, dove il conflitto ha natura settaria e si basa su interessi strategici fondamentali per entrambi i paesi ai fini del mantenimento di una posizione di potere nella regione. Inoltre, risulterà difficile per Rouhani creare un consenso interno nella leadership iraniana volta ad implementare una distensione di fatto ed una reale cooperazione con Riyad.

La convocazione del viceministro degli Esteri Abdollahian presso la Commissione di Sicurezza Nazionale e Politica Estera del Parlamento iraniano (il Majlis), per rispondere alle critiche mosse nei confronti della visita effettuata dal rappresentante governativo iraniano in Arabia Saudita, sono una chiara dimostrazione di ciò. I rappresentanti della Commissione hanno infatti sostenuto che “la visita non era necessaria data la posizione del paese ed il suo approccio nella regione”, caratterizzato da “un ruolo diretto nella creazione dell’IS e la cooperazione con gli Stati Uniti per raggiungere i suoi obiettivi”.

Le stessa accuse sono state reiterate dal rappresentante presso le Guardie rivoluzionarie del Leader supremo Ali Khamenei, che ha pertanto indirettamente escluso qualsiasi possibilità di cooperazione bilaterale. Gli ufficiali sauditi sembrano d’altra parte dubitare dell’effettivo potere di Rouhani e del suo gabinetto nel controllo e nella gestione della politica regionale iraniana, mossi dalla consapevolezza che tali questioni sono soggette per lo più alle decisioni prese dalle Guardie Rivoluzionarie e dalle Forze Quds, comandate dal generale Qassim Suleimani.

È dunque probabile che la distensione tra Teheran e Riyad rimarrà temporanea e limitata esclusivamente al piano della rispettiva retorica, mentre la fine della guerra per procura tra i due paesi nella regione, per quanto auspicabile, sembra per il momento soltanto una chimera.

Source:  aspeninstitute.it

ISIS Kills Muslims

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jfpPrq7rc5U&feature=youtu.be

La "galassia" jihadista, da Al Qaida allo Stato Islamico, da Al Nusra fino al gruppo Khorasan: metodi, strategie d'azione e scopi

Nei giorni in cui la comunità internazionale, con Stati Uniti e Francia in testa, ha iniziato a mettere in atto la campagna per combattere l’IS (Stato Islamico) in Iraq e Siria, fonti di intelligence statunitensi hanno riportato di una nuova e più diretta minaccia all’Occidente, rappresentata da un altro gruppo jihadista attivo in Siria. Il gruppo si chiamerebbe Khorasan e sarebbe guidato da un terrorista legato al nucleo di al-Qaida centrale ancora presente tra l’Afghanistan e il Pakistan, Muhsin al-Fadhli.

A differenza dell’IS, con cui Khorasan sarebbe in competizione, l’obiettivo di questo gruppo jihadista sarebbe focalizzato a colpire obiettivi prevalentemente occidentali, come già avvenuto in passato in operazioni coordinate da al-Fadhli. Se confermata, la notizia proverebbe l’eterogeneità della galassia jihadista nel Vicino Oriente, oltre a testimoniare il fatto che al-Qaida è ancora attiva, nonostante abbia compiuto negli ultimi anni una sorta di ritirata strategica. Allo stesso tempo, gli Stati Uniti dovranno ancora una volta scegliere come agire in Siria, teatro che rappresenta il vero punto debole della strategia anti-jihadista di Obama.

L’allarme circa la nuova minaccia agli Stati Uniti, rappresentata dall’esistenza del gruppo Khorasan in Siria, è stato lanciato in un articolo del New York Times due giorni fa. Nell’articolo, si fa riferimento a fonti di intelligence statunitensi, e in particolare, si riportano le parole del capo dell’intelligence nazionale, James R. Clapper Jr., secondo cui “in termini di minaccia agli Stati Uniti, Khorasan può rappresentare una minaccia tanto grande, quanto quella dello Stato Islamico”.

Si sottolinea come, negli ultimi mesi, l’interesse è stato rivolto soprattutto all’IS, ma ciò avrebbe distorto la percezione del terrorismo nell’area. In particolare Khorasan, così come Jabhat al-Nusra (affiliata di al-Qaida in Siria) costituiscono minacce più immediate alla sicurezza statunitense. Il gruppo, il cui nome deriva dalla regione storica che comprendeva parte degli attuali Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tagikistan e Afghanistan, avrebbe le proprie radici proprio in Iran e, attualmente, è composto da jihadisti provenienti dal Pakistan e dall’Afghanistan, ma anche da alcuni Paesi occidentali.

Il leader del gruppo è Muhsin al-Fadhli, ex capo del network di al-Qaida in Iran. Già lo scorso marzo, la rivista specializzata di terrorismo The Long War Journal, riportava la notizia secondo cui al-Fadhli aveva spostato il centro delle proprie attività in Siria, in accordo con al-Qaida centrale e la sua leadership in Pakistan. Lo stesso al-Fadhli ha appoggiato l’appello di al-Zawahiri, numero uno di al-Qaida, contro l’IS, contribuendo a creare lo spaccamento tra il fronte qaidista e il gruppo di al-Baghdadi.

In Siria, Khorasan costituisce un gruppo di appoggio a Jabhat al-Nusra. Secondo le fonti statunitensi, il gruppo avrebbe legami anche con al-Qaida nella Penisola Arabica (Aqap), il gruppo affiliato ad al-Qaida attivo in Yemen. Di quest’ultimo fa parte Ibrahim al-Asiri, considerato il più importante fabbricatore di esplosivi della galassia qaidista: quest’ultimo elemento ha messo in allarme l’intelligence statunitense.

Proprio il supposto reclutamento di jihadisti europei, unito alla capacità di fabbricare esplosivi, sono fattori alla base dei timori statunitensi. L’ex vice-direttore della Cia, Mike Morell, ha confermato che molti membri verrebbero dal Pakistan e che l’obiettivo principale di Khorasan è quello di colpire con ordigni esplosivi obiettivi occidentali, soprattutto aerei di linea. Secondo Morell, il gruppo ancora vedrebbe gli aerei di linea come il simbolo dell’Occidedente e, per questo, ambirebbe a ripetere operazioni in stile 11 settembre.

Il connubio tra l’esistenza di jhadisti occidentali presenti in Siria, ma che potrebbero tornare in Occidente, e l’expertise nella fabbricazione di bombe, rappresenta l’entità della minaccia. Al contrario, attualmente l’IS sembra più concentrata a combattere la guerra sul campo in Iraq e Siria, piuttosto che a condurre direttamente attacchi contro l’Occidente. Associated Press riporta altre fonti di intelligence, secondo le quali Khorasan sarebbe in Siria proprio con l’obiettivo primario di reclutare jihadisti per gli attacchi all’Occidente.

Source: ISPI

Do Syrians support US airstrikes in Syria?

I siriani preferiscono gli attacchi aerei americani e francesi contro i terroristi dello Stato Islamico oppure...

As a wary US Congress passed a resolution authorizing the Barack Obama administration to arm Syrian rebels against the Islamic State (IS), and as US military planners consider airstrikes against IS in Syria, Al-Monitor’s Syria Pulse covered how Syrians, suffering from more than three years of war, might react.
Khaled Attalah reports from Damascus that Syrians there prefer a political solution to the war rather than US airstrikes.

The National Coordinating Committee for Democratic Change in Syria rejects US intervention in Syria, even with the Syrian government’s approval.

Attalah writes, “After mobilizing its allies from around the world, the White House hopes that by using force and launching airstrikes, the IS threat will disappear. However, the Syrian people are not only hoping to be rid of this terrorist group, but also the bloody bottleneck they have been living through for more than three years.”

Reporting from the Al-Bab region, an IS stronghold east of Aleppo, Al-Monitor columnist Edward Dark writes that the prospect of US airstrikes is being greeted with more anxiety than enthusiasm, and could redound to the advantage of IS.

Dark speculates that “it would be foolish to believe that US military action against IS is popular here or will go down well, especially when civilian casualties start to mount. On the contrary, it will most likely prove counterproductive, stoking anti-Western resentment among the population and increasing support for IS, driving even more recruits to its ranks. The terror group knows this well, which is why it is secretly overjoyed at the prospect of military action against it. In its calculations, the loss of fighters to strikes is more than outweighed by the outpouring of support it expects both locally and on the international jihadist scene.”
In a separate report from Aleppo, Dark questions the wisdom and timing of an expanded train-and-equip approach to US- and Saudi-backed opposition groups.

“The failure of these groups to make substantial gains against the regime or the jihadists despite a large investment in arms, funds and training begs the question of what has now changed. If they were unreliable then, what makes them a viable option now? Not only were some of them merely unreliable, but they also openly collaborated and allied with al-Qaeda-linked groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, or through sheer incompetence and corruption allowed Western-supplied weapons and equipment to fall into the hands of extremists. Indeed, the stigma of corruption and ineptitude permeates most of the Syrian rebel factions designated as 'moderates,' and some have even been involved outright in serious war crimes. This makes them not only an unreliable ally on the ground, but also a potentially very dangerous one.”

Dark observes that the moderate Syrian opposition groups are not close to winning "hearts and minds" in Syria. IS, while a bigger loser in the hearts and minds category, and despite its brutality, has nonetheless brought some degree of order and services to the areas it controls in Aleppo:

“The rise and popularity of IS seems to have more to do with the failings of the Syrian opposition and the fractious rebel factions than with the Islamic State's own strength. For almost three years, the opposition and the local rebels had failed to provide any semblance of civil administration or public services to the vast areas they controlled. This lawless chaos added to the people’s misery, already exacerbated by the horrors of war. In the end, they rallied around the only group that managed to give them what they wanted: the Islamic State. But now, it seems a new fear is rising among the people: the specter of war against IS, a war they feel threatens not only their lives, but also their livelihoods and the tenuous normality they’ve grown accustomed to."

Dark concludes that the most effective of all bad alternatives to defeat IS, which is the US priority in Syria, might be for the United States to reach a tactical understanding with the Syrian government:
“The only alternative then appears to be an unpalatable and unholy alliance with the Syrian regime, the only force on the ground right now capable of taking on and defeating IS with any degree of success,” Dark writes.

Kerry says role for Iran in battle with IS
While the Obama administration has ruled out an alliance with Syria, Iran could be a bridge to Damascus within an international coalition against IS and in a subsequent political transition in Syria.
US Secretary of State John Kerry, chairing a UN Security Council meeting on Iraq Sept. 19, said, "The coalition required to eliminate [IS] is not only, or even primarily, military in nature. It must be comprehensive and include close collaboration across multiple lines of effort. ... There is a role for nearly every country in the world to play, including Iran."

This column suggested in February that Iran and Saudi Arabia could join a new regional counterterrorism alliance among Syria and its neighbors, and in May proposed that the United States should test Iran on its declared willingness to battle extremists in Syria.
Ali Hashem reports this week that Iran has a vital interest in defeating IS, whatever the United States decides to do.

“Iran’s problem isn’t related to how and where to fight IS, but rather over the conflict between its national security and its regional security,” Hashim writes. “IS has had a base in Iraq — Jalawla — as close as 38 kilometers (23.6 miles) from the Iranian border, and Iran wants to get rid of the self-styled IS at any price. It doesn’t matter if this happens with the help of the Iraqi army, the Shiite militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Kurdish peshmerga or the United States, as long as there are results on the ground. A good example is the breaking of the siege around the town of Amirli in northeast Iraq. The operation was the result of US-Iranian indirect cooperation that ended with an obvious success. On the ground, pro-Iranian Shiite militias along with the Iraqi army advanced while US fighter jets bombed the IS posts.”
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein-Amir Abdollahian told Hashim that Iran isn’t “interested in taking part in any show-off conferences that claim to combat terrorism.”

“They [US officials] want to build an Iraqi army, train Syrian fighters and decide on whether they are going to strike inside Syria or not; meanwhile, Iran is fighting the war helping its allies, clear on the general strategy, and we know we’ll win in the end,” Abdollahian said.

SRF opposition forces still battling IS
Mohammed al-Khatieb, reporting from Marea, outside Aleppo, on the front lines between Syrian Revolutionary Forces (SRF) under the command of Jamal Maarouf and IS, refuted reports that the SRF had signed a nonaggression pact with IS.

Khatieb observed firsthand the deployment of hundreds of SRF fighters and interviewed SRF military commanders on their ongoing operations against IS.
Syrian government forces attempted to assassinate Maarouf, who is backed by Saudi Arabia, on Sept. 17, killing his daughter in the operation.

Khatieb writes, “The attempt on Maarouf's life is a message from the regime to the United States that it will not hesitate to target US allies, after Washington snubbed the regime by deciding to fund the Syrian rebels in the fight against IS.”

Syrian Kurds under siege by IS
One of the most effective Syrian armed groups, the Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG), is losing ground in the battle with IS forces in the Ain al-Arab (Kobani in Kurdish) region of Syria, the military arm of the Democratic Union party (PYD), forcing thousands of Syrian Kurds to flee into Turkey.
Amberin Zaman reports that US and international support for the PYD and YPG, which has support among Syrian Kurds, who number at least 10% of Syria’s population of 23 million, has lagged because of the group’s affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) of Turkey.

The United States considers the PKK a terrorist group, and Turkey has been unwilling to grant the PKK an edge in either its peace negotiations with the PKK or in Syria.

However, Zaman writes, “The PKK and the PYD/YPG are continuing their battle for global acceptance. In a move apparently calculated to provide the Obama administration with a fig leaf for future cooperation, the YPG recently sealed an anti-IS alliance with various groups affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), founding what they call the Joint Action Center. Its purported goal is to liberate all territories held by IS in Syria.”
IS has reportedly taken 40 villages from YPG forces in recent fighting.

Source: Al Monitor

US admits there is a much scarier terrorist group than ISIS:
Khorasan

Notizie di intelligence hanno avvisato Washington che lo scontro con lo Stato islamico può distogliere l'attenzione dei media da una minaccia, se possibile ancora più sinistra, proveniente da un gruppo terrorista molto meno noto ma potenzialmente molto più pericoloso, sorto dalle ceneri della guerra siriana.

Very little information is being released at the moment by anyone within American intelligence circles, but the group calling itself Khorasan is said by officials to have concrete plans for striking targets in the United States and Europe as a chosen modus operandi – more so than the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as ISIS.
The first ever mention of the group occurred on Thursday at an intelligence gathering in Washington DC, when National Intelligence Director James Clapper admitted that “in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State.”
 
According to the New York Times, some US officials have gone as far as saying that, while the Islamic State is undoubtedly more prominent in its show of force in the Middle East, it is Khorasan who's intent on oversees campaigns in a way Al Qaeda usually is.
In this sense, the US air strike campaign and the coming actions by the anti-IS coalition might just be what coaxes the IS into larger-scale attacks on American and European soil – what Khorasan is essentially all about.

This brings up another issue seen in the current Western stance on terrorism: it is so focused on the terror spread by the IS that it’s beginning to forget that the destruction and mayhem of civil war across the Middle East is spawning a number of hard-to-track terrorist factions with distinct missions.
“What you have is a growing body of extremists from around the world who are coming in and taking advantage of the ungoverned areas and creating informal ad hoc groups that are not directly aligned with ISIS or Nusra,” a senior law enforcement official told the NY Times on condition of anonymity.
The CIA and the White House declined to give comment.

According to government sources, the Al-Qaeda offshoot group is led by a former senior operative – 33-year-old Muhsin al-Fadhli, reportedly so close to Bin Laden’s inner circle he was one of the few who knew of the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in advance.
He had reportedly fled to Iran during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s story goes hazy after the campaign: many operatives are said to have traveled to Pakistan, Syria, Iran and other countries, forming splinter groups.
In 2012, al-Fadhli was identified by the State Department as leading the Iranian branch of Al-Qaeda, controlling “the movement of funds and operatives” in the region and working closely with wealthy “jihadist donors” in his native Kuwait to raise money for the Syrian terrorist resistance.

Although the first public mention of the group was only this Thursday, American intelligence is said to have been tracking it for over a decade. Former President George W. Bush once mentioned the name of its leader in 2005 in connection with a French oil tanker bombing in 2002 off the coast of Yemen.
Khorasan itself is shrouded in mystery. Little is known publicly apart from its being composed of former Al-Qaeda operatives from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. The group is said to favor concealed explosives as a terror method.
Like many other groups taking up the power vacuum in war-torn Syria, Khorasan has on occasion shifted its alliances.

Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri at one point ordered the former ISIS to fight only in Iraq, but cut all ties with it when it disobeyed and branched out. The result was that the Nusra Front became Al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria. It’s said that Khorasan is to Al Nusra Front what the latter was to Al-Qaeda.
When The Daily Signal spoke to James Phillips, a Middle East expert at The Heritage Foundation, he outlined some American intelligence views on the group: they see their mission in “[recruiting] European and American Muslim militants who have traveled to Syria to fight alongside Islamist extremist groups that form part of the rebel coalition fighting Syria’s Assad regime.”
“The Khorasan group hopes to train and deploy these recruits, who hold American and European passports, for attacks against Western targets,” he said.

He believes Khorasan to be Al-Qaeda’s new arm in attacking America, its “far enemy.” While they are Al Nusra’s allies in Syria, their role is believed to be to carry out terrorist attacks outside the country.
The group reportedly uses the services of a very prominent Al-Qaeda bomb maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, whose devices previously ended up on three US-bound planes. He is known to be a true pioneer of hard-to-detect bombs.
Phillips believes that the next step is taking those bombs and pairing them with US-born and other foreign jihadists returning home.

In this respect, Phillips views the Khorasan threat to the US to be much more direct compared to the Islamic State’s more regional ambitions. And since President Obama’s upcoming anti-IS strategy reportedly does not include Al Nusra, this potentially frees Khorasan’s hands.
What sets Al Nusra apart from the many other groups is that it’s now the only faction with active branches throughout Syria.

Syria analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, Jennifer Cafarella, told the NY Times “there is definitely a threat that, if not conducted as a component of a properly tailored strategy within Syria, the American strikes would allow the Nusra Front to fill a vacuum in eastern Syria.”
Because of al-Zawahiri’s current weakened position in terrorist cricles, both Al Nusra and Khorasan by extension are less prominent than the IS. But these things have a way of changing unpredictably, and because the plans of these more traditional terrorist groups in Syria aren’t yet clear, a danger arises.
The volatile conflict zone that is Syria, with its lax borders and an increasing number of distinct, armed Islamist groups, the US may be surprised by how difficult it soon may be to pinpoint the origin of the next threat.

Source:  rt.com