The Iran nuclear deal, the fight against ISIL and Iran’s domestic troubles
According to a Reuters report, Iran is
ready to work with the United States and its allies to stop the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), but would like more
flexibility on Iran's uranium enrichment program in exchange. "Iran is a
very influential country in the region and can help in the fight
against the ISIL [Islamic State – IS] terrorists ... but it is a two-way
street.
You give something, you take something," said a senior Iranian
official. "ISIL is a threat to world security, not our (nuclear)
program, which is a peaceful program," the official added. Another
Iranian official echoed the remarks. Both officials said they would like
the United States and its Western allies to show flexibility on the
number of atomic centrifuges Tehran could keep under any long-term deal
that would lift sanctions.
According to this report, Iran has sent
mixed signals about its willingness to cooperate on defeating ISIL.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said recently that he
vetoed a U.S. overture to the Islamic Republic to work together on this
matter, while U.S. officials said there was no such offer. In public,
both Washington and Tehran have ruled out cooperating militarily but in
private, Iranian officials have voiced a willingness to work with the
U.S., though not necessarily on the battlefield.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said
on September 19 that Iran has a role to play in defeating Islamic State,
indicating the U.S. position may also be shifting. Despite not being
invited to join the U.S.-led military coalition, Iran - Kerry said -
could help “take out” IS.
In a recent article analyzing Iran’s
nuclear negotiating strategy toward a deal before the November 24
deadline, Suzanne Maloney, a former U.S. State Department policy advisor
and Iran expert, argues that the Iranian approach “also relies on
[Iranian President Rouhani’s] calculation that after more than a decade
of frustrating talks and amidst a context of regional chaos,
international resolve on the protracted, intractable nuclear crisis may
be waning” against the backdrop of the emergence of the arguably more
compelling threat from ISIL.
She notes that both Rouhani and his Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif focused their public remarks while at the UN
General Assembly in New York in September “on the proposition that an
expeditious nuclear bargain could be instrumental in securing Iranian
assistance in the U.S.-led campaign to degrade ISIL.”
Maloney notes that this attitude has
influenced some audiences, among them former British foreign secretary
Jack Straw, who recently published an article claiming PM “[David]
Cameron should risk doing a deal with Iran” and his colleagues in the
“P5 +1” (US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) should be
careful "not to make the best the enemy of the good."
Actually, it is Iran that needs the West
against ISIL, as it could soon become the priority target in the
evolving Sunni-Shiite sectarian terrorist war.
The ISIL threat to Iran
A recent document attributed to Abdullah
Ahmed al-Meshedani, said to be a member of ISIL’s “war cabinet,” which
Western security officials have deemed authentic, proposes an unlikely
[wishful thinking] alliance with Russia against Tehran and Damascus in
exchange for “Iran and its nuclear program” which would include inter alia Moscow
access to an ISIL-held gas field in Iraq and backing the Sunni Gulf
states against Shiite Iran and Alawite Syria. ISIL’s ultimate goal was
to strip Iran of “all its power,” killing Iranian teachers, diplomats
and businessmen and even destroying the Iranian caviar industry and
“exterminating” its carpet industry.
Since ISIL took control of Mosul, the
second biggest Iraqi city, the Iraqi army crumbled like a house of
cards, ISIL stormed most of the Sunni towns in the Nineveh and Anbar
provinces at the beginning of June 2014, approached Baghdad and
threatened to attack the Shiite holy sites in Karbala and Najaf, the
Iranian military leaders issued numerous, quite hysterical, declarations
and went out of their way to convince their audience that Iran’s
territory is not under threat.
At the end of June 2014, Iranian border
guards commander General Hossein Zolfaqari said the “ISIL terrorist
group which has caused chaos in Northern and Northwestern Iraq in the
last two weeks” has not approached Iran's borders in the West. He said
Iran was boosting border checkpoints and plans to improve equipment of
border units. Iranian Interior Ministry Spokesman Hossein Ali Amiri
noted that there is no security lapse along Iran's borders with the
neighboring countries, and no notable problem along the border with
Iraq. “However, the necessary measures have been adopted by the Interior
Ministry and border police,” he added.
At the same time, Deputy Chief Liaison
of the Iranian Army's Ground Force troops General Ali Arasteh said
divisions in the South and Southeast have gone on alert due to the
unrests in Iraq. Lieutenant Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards
Corps (IRGC) Ground Force Brigadier General Abdollah Araqi also stressed
that the country's borders are fully secure, adding that Iranian
borders have been reinforced in terms of manpower and military
equipment. Lieutenant Commander of the Iranian Ground Force Brigadier
General Kioumars Heidari reiterated full control over the country's
borders, and said the terrorists active in Iraq don’t dare to pose a
threat to Iran. Heidari claimed that what is happening in the regional
states “is a part of the plots hatched by the arrogant powers and the
Zionist regime.”
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian
Armed Forces for Cultural Affairs and Defense Publicity Brigadier
General Massoud Jazayeri warned that Iran will give a crushing response
to terrorists “and even their supporters” (hinting to U.S. and its
regional allies) in case they dare to approach its borders.
By the beginning of July, Iran's Police
Chief Brigadier General Esmayeel Ahmadi Moqaddam underlined preparedness
of the country's military, security and intelligence forces “to thwart
any destabilizing threat to Iran's borders, particularly in the West”.
He said some ISIL militants may be arrested at Western borders, but no
ISIL command has entered Iran “and there is no concern about terrorism.”
While Iranian Navy Commander Rear
Admiral Habibollah Sayyari underscored the country's special and
influential role in the region and the world he also mentioned the
necessity for increasing security levels in Iran's coastal areas.
The Commander of Iran's Basij
(volunteer) Force Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi claimed that
“the US has created and supported the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) to sow discord among Muslims” and as a means to
cause division in the Middle East region.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
underlined Tehran's preparedness to help Iraq in fighting terrorism, but
dismissed any military assistance to Iraq or deployment of any Iranian
troops there. However he claimed “that the great Iranian nation will
spare no efforts to protect their holy sites.”
However, several days later, Iranian
Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian expressed concern about
the situation in Iraq and said Tehran “is ready to dispatch weapons to
Iraq within the framework of fighting terrorism” if asked by the Iraqi
government. Abdollahian accused the U.S. of “trying to create a chaotic
atmosphere in the Arab country similar to what it did in Ukraine.”
By mid-October, Iranian television
published a picture of Quds Force Major General Qassem Suleimani on an
Iraqi battlefield surrounded by Kurdish peshmerga fighters. His
“transformation from a man in the shadows as chief of covert foreign
operations for the Revolutionary Guards into a public hero” is central
to Iran's message to the world: If you want to beat Sunni militants, you
need the help of the Shiite nation and its top military commander. "He
is sending a message to the U.S. about their influence," said Antony
Cordesman, a senior analyst at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies. "And there is a message to the Arabs that they too have to deal with Iran."
Iranian General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said
on state television in August that ISIL would have seized the Iraqi
Kurdish capital of Erbil had it not been for Suleimani and 70 of his men
intervening to defend the city.
Although Iran fell short of declaring an
official armed intervention, the IRGC did send to Iraq Qods Force
personnel, ground attack aircraft, and drones to protect key Iraqi
Shiite communities and holy sites from ISIL takeover. Qods Force teams
are located at Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala, and near Tikrit. These units
have also been central to Iran's plan for organizing local Shiite
militias that work with Iraqi government forces but are aligned with
Tehran, on the model of popular militia units in Syria. Iran also
reportedly deployed to Iraq up to seven ground attack Su-25 jets.
Initially these steps were taken to
protect the then close ally Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, but Iran is
prepared to offer substantial military support to any agreed successor
in order to keep its influence in Baghdad and secure its own borders and
stability.
Iran’s Domestic Troubles
Iran’s borders and its stability are
threatened not only by external Sunni radical forces like ISIL, but also
by internal ethnic and sectarian hazards which could erupt under
certain conditions as Iran is sucked more deeply into the Iraqi and
Syrian quagmire.
Iran is not different from Iraq and can
be even compared with Syria. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam
(Leiden) Persians represent only 65% of its population (55% according to
other sources), Azeris 16%, Kurds 7%, Lurs 6%, Arabs 2%, Baloch 2%,
Turkmens 1%, and others less than 1%. Most of Iran’s minorities live in
the provinces adjacent to its borders, the Kurds and the Arabs next to
Iraq and the Baloch on the two sides of the Pakistani border. In
contrast to the diversity of its ethnic landscape, Iran is relatively
homogenous in terms of religion as 89 percent of the population is
Shiite. The Sunni Muslims are largely drawn from Iran’s Kurdish, Baloch,
and Turkmen populations.
Western analysts and policymakers pay
little attention to the plight of Iran’s ethnic minorities, which have
been heavily marginalized by the Persian-dominated Shiite theocracy. The
suppression of minority rights has resulted in ethnic insurgencies over
the years, some of which continue to trouble the Iranian regime. RAND
analysts evaluated in April 2013 that Iran's quickly declining economy
and its increasing international isolation could push ethnic minorities
and their Persian brethren to join forces and to pose a serious
challenge to the Tehran regime.
Arabistan
The Iranian Arab ethnic minority, the
Ahwazis, has long endured oppression and discrimination and could be the
first to emulate its Sunni brethren in Iraq and Syria. Iranian Arabs
suffer from widespread poverty despite the fact that they inhabit a
region rich in natural resources. Arab nationalist insurgents led by the
Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) were
responsible for six attacks against energy infrastructure in the oil
rich Khuzestan Province in 2013. Iranian Arabs and many pan-Arab
nationalists refer to Khuzestan Province as Arabistan. According to the
Iranian media ASMLA militants staged 20 operations in 2012 and they had
received financial support and operational training in Dubai. A group
of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) named itself “the al-Ahwaz Battalion” in a
sign of solidarity with the Iranian Arab cause and to single out Iran’s
support for the Alawite regime.
Iranian Kurdistan
The Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan (PDKI) is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish
opposition groups and seeks autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. It was
established in 1945 in Mahabad in Iran. A few months after its creation,
on January 22, 1946, the PDK established the short-lived independent
“Republic of Kurdistan,” destroyed by the Iranian army on December 17,
1946. After the revolution of 1979 it emerged as a mass-based party and
one of the mainstream political forces in Iran. Two of KDPI's general
secretaries, Dr. A.R. Ghassemloo and Dr S. Sharafkandi were assassinated
by the Iranian agents in Vienna and Berlin. Today the group is based in
Iraqi Kurdistan, but agreed to respect the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s (KRG) demand not to carry out armed operations against the
Islamic Republic.
According to PDKI’s website, during a
couple of weeks between August and September 2014 at least 25 members of
the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as an agent
of the intelligence agency Ettela’at were killed in different locations
in Iranian Kurdistan. It is noteworthy that these operations have
coincided with the 22 anniversary of the assassination of Kurdish leader
Dr. Sadeq Sharafkandi.
The KDPI’s fights with the Iranian
military in Iran marked the first clashes between the two in years. An
Iranian army commander and several Iranian soldiers were killed in
clashes in Shino. The KDPI has claimed responsibility for the recent
battles and announced that they are deploying their fighters to Iran for
“political activities,” apparently in defiance of the KRG’s stance.
Despite the concerns of the KRG, KDPI senior officials announced the
group will not retreat from the Iranian Kurdistan.
Khalid Azizi, the secretary-general of
KDPI claimed that the September clashes happened when Iranian troops set
ambushes to his forces, prompting a response from the Kurdish
guerrillas. The Iranian Kurdish leader said he was committed to
resolving issues with Tehran peacefully. Azizi denied he came under
pressure from the KRG in Iraq to halt the fighting, but acknowledged:
“We cannot use Kurdish lands [in Iraq] to launch attacks against Iran.”
Azizi could not explain why these Iranian provocations happened “while
the region is on fire and Iran is involved in one way or another in the
wars in Syria and Iraq?”
Other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups
are split on the KDPI’s new armed campaign against Iran. The Kurdistan
Tailors’ Movement, said his group “will support any Kurdish political
parties that fight the Islamic Republic,” as time is right for armed
struggle. He said he expects the fighters could suffer losses in the
early stages but will gradually gain experience. The Kurdistan Struggle
Agency also supports armed activities against Iran and if they “have a
good opportunity will resume armed struggle.”
The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
(Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê - PJAK) is a pan-Kurdish militant
nationalist group operating since April 2004 from bases located in
mountainous regions of Northern Iraq striving to establish a
semi-autonomous Kurdish regional entity in Iran, similar to the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. The PJAK has about 3,000
armed militiamen, half of them women. The PJAK, an offshoot of the
Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - PKK),
adopted many of the political ideas and military tactics of the PKK.
General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, Iranian
Ground Force Commander Brigadier, announced that his forces have killed a
number of PJAK militants who were trying to sneak into Iranian
Kurdistan region (Rojhelat) carrying packs of explosives in June 2014.
He termed the operation as a hard blow to PJAK.
Iranian Baluchistan
A Sunni extremist group, Jaish ul-Adl,
or the Army of Justice, based in Pakistan, has been carrying out a
program of harassment, train derailments, assassinations and bombings
since mid-2013. There has been a surge of attacks against Iranian
military and provincial officials in Iranian Baluchistan in autumn 2013.
On October 25, 2013, Jaish-ul-Adl killed 14 Iranian border guards and
wounded six others in the border region near the city of Saravan in
Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Iranian Sunni Islamists claimed
responsibility for the killing of an Iranian prosecutor in Sistan
Baluchistan province in November 2013 as revenge for the hanging of 16
prisoners carried in Iranian jails after the attack by the Jaish ul-Adl
group in which Iranian 14 border guards were killed.
Five Iranian border guards were
kidnapped by Jaish-ul-Adl on February 6, 2014 in southeastern Iran and
taken into Pakistan. Jaish-ul-Adl killed one of the abductees. Iran has
declared that it holds the Pakistani government responsible for the
lives of the Iranian hostages.
However, in April Jaish Al-Adl released
four of the five Iranian border guards who were kidnapped in February.
After the fifth guard was executed Jaish ul-Adl threatened to kill
another captive in 10 days but the insurgents “suspended the threat
because it was in talks with Iranian authorities.”
According to the New York Times,
Sunni insurgents in Pakistan increased attacks on Iranian border posts
in the southeast of the country at the beginning of October, employing
methods similar to those used by Islamic State militants in Syria and
Iraq. A car bomber struck a fortified base near the city of Saravan,
killing a senior officer; three police officers were killed in an ambush
after responding to a distress call. In September, insurgents rammed a
vehicle laden with more than 1,000 pounds of explosives into one of the
outer walls of a central base before launching a surprise attack with a
convoy of pickup trucks carrying 70 militants. Brig. Gen. Mohammad
Pakpur of the IRGC said the attackers had been repelled only after a
long firefight and the arrival of reinforcements.
On October 11, 2014 an Iranian police
aircraft crashed in southeastern Iran killing all seven people on board.
The victims included three senior police officers and a police employee
travelling to the area to investigate the killing of four Iranian
police border guards by gunmen near the Iran-Pakistan border. No group
has claimed the attack, but Jaish ul-Adl is suspected to be responsible
for the crash.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of Iran’s external
and internal woes why the United States and its allies should be
impressed by Tehran’s proposals to help in the fight against ISIL and
Sunni jihadists? More importantly, why should the West compromise on the
vital nuclear issue when it is clear the Islamic Republic regime itself
is a destabilizing force in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Middle
East at large?
Source: Ely Karmon,
ict.org.il
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