Last Chance for Libya: Libyan Factions and International Actors
Today
Libya appears to be a country on the verge of collapse, finding itself
in a chaotic situation close to what could be called a “multi-factional”
civil war, albeit low-intensity. Libya’s parliament, elected in June,
is recognized by the international community but contested by the
militia controlling most of Tripoli and by radical Islamists who hold
much of the eastern part of Benghazi.
The causes.
The causes of this situation are numerous and cannot be dealt with here
in depth but mentioned only: some can be ascribed to the Qaddafi
regime, in particular to its special form of “informal” government that
prevented the creation of institutions that would survive his fall;
while others, perhaps larger ones – as also emphasized by Karim Mezran
of the Atlantic Council – can be ascribed to the “false myth of
revolution” purportedly underway since February 17, 2011. The revolution
narrative has prevented comprehension of the fact that events following
that date were actually a genuine civil war. A conflict that did not
end with the murder of Muammar Qaddafi but, after remaining latent for
several months, progressively heightened with the course of time and the
inability of Libyan governments to come to terms with history and begin
a new chapter of coexistence by creating a new social pact between all
parties.
A negative
acceleration of events led to the removal of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, a
factor that weighed gravely on the possibility of a political agreement
between the Libyan forces close to the Muslim Brotherhood and the laic
ones. After his overthrow the phenomenon of political polarization
progressively extended to the military sphere, with clashes in the city
of Tripoli, and particularly at its main airport, between Misrata
militias (linked to the Brotherhood) and the forces of Zintan, close to
the party of Mahmoud Jibril.
The responsibility of the international community.
The international community is certainly also to be blamed, having
conducted a military operation that, in the deluded hope of leaving
“Libya to the Libyans” left Libya swamped with problems and did not
assume, or only belatedly assumed, its own responsibility for
politically aiding the new Libya.
What
can be done now? While a new international military operation is trying
to halt the destabilization of huge parts of Syria and Iraq provoked by
the jihadists of the Islamic State, can the international community
contemplate a new intervention in Libya? Will be it effective or
counterproductive? With what goal? With what means?
Reduce the polarization.
First of all one must try to take a view of what is happening and of
the aforesaid political polarization that is less Manichean than what
the international press reports. Libya does not appear to be totally in
the hands of Islamic radicals, although in such a chaotic situation they
certainly constitute the biggest threat to the country’s future. The
Misrata militias cannot be compared to or equated with the Ansar
al-Sharia jihadist group prevalently present in Cyrenaica.
Although the
Misrata militias and their political references in the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) have often held ambiguous positions and have sometimes
shown a tactical convergence with the radicals, this tie is not at all
ideological but represents the outcome of events and of the military
campaign launched indiscriminately against “Islamists”. It is difficult
to imagine a pacified Libya that excludes Misrata, its third largest
city. Moreover, government departments in Tripoli appear to be coming
under the control of the National Salvation Government (lead by
Misrata-MB), further isolating the elected Tobruk-based House of
Representatives and the government of Abdullah al-Thinni.
The
international community must launch a unified message and try to speak
with a single voice. The first – important – step was taken with a joint
communiqué from European countries, the United States and regional
actors, from Egypt to the Emirates, Qatar and Turkey, which have
interests in Libya and have taken very different stances, ending up by
fostering this polarization. The second step are the UN-brokered talks
in Ghadames. At last Ban Ki-Moon in Tripoli urged the formation of a
national unity cabinet as the only way to restore stability. EU and the
Atlantic Alliance can help to maintain this common position.
The option
to pursue remains that of involving all the forces that showed
themselves willing to participate in the democratic process. The real
wedge should be forced between jihadist forces and the Islamists willing
to participate in this process. It’s necessary to make pressure on
Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, also through Tunisian Ennahda party or
Turkey. It should be clear that the international community will not
accept an unelected government in control of the capital, the central
bank and public administration. At the same time it’s necessary to
strongly recommend Egypt and the Gulf countries to support the
negotiations, not to make air raids.
Political agreement.
Several different ways of intervening have already been hypothesized.
In my opinion whatever intervention is imagined should take what has
just been described into account. Equally important is another
consideration: the aim of any political or military operation cannot be
to back one side to the detriment of the other but rather to ensure a
neutral political agreement, which would also lessen the risks of any
mission failing and of making mission forces a target. The only kind of
“boots on the ground” option could be based on a “Lebanese model” and it
should be preceded by diplomacy, with an agreement between the various
parties and with international and regional communities united.
Operations of another kind would arouse anti-Western feelings without
any certainty of stabilizing the country (as the recent cases of
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate).
Jihadists in Cyrenaica.
In any case, remaining a problem in this country’s chaos is the
presence of a declaredly jihadist force. Ansar al-Sharia can certainly
be contained militarily but at the same time we need to keep its members
from gaining political influence. Ansar al-Sharia and the various
militias allied with it appear to admire “caliphate” or ISIS, especially
between the young generations of mujahidin. Many Libyans have fought
and are fighting on the Syrian-Iraqi front.
In percentage of population,
Libya is one of the countries with the most mujahidin and this – after
their return home – has favored ties between Libyan radicals and those
of Syria and Iraq (more than 500 Libyans are still present on this
front). The Islamic Youth Shura Council announced last week that they
are affiliated to ISIS. However, Ansar al-Sharia is not just a terrorist
group but also seems to be gaining the consensus of inhabitants through
“dawa”, or charitable works and control of the territory in
substitution for the state, the welfare state and Libyan institutions.
It’s here that the battle is harder and more complex. If the
international community permits to Ansar al-Sharia and other radical
militias in Cyrenaica to became a sort of Hamas or Hezbollah, the
stability of the whole country will be compromise.
General
Haftar’s aim is military containment. This has enabled the
international community and Western forces to avoid direct intervention.
However, there is always danger in having others do your work. First
and foremost, Haftar has shown no desire to distinguish between
Islamists, declaring his will to “eliminate them all” and this has
fostered the tactical convergence we spoke of between radical militias
and Islamist political forces of various types. In addition there is the
risk of creating a new autocratic regime and putting the country in the
hands of new military leaders lacking charisma and the consensus that
at least those of the past enjoyed. In August, Haftar’s Operation
Dignity was formally integrated into the national army when Nazhuri, a
senior Dignity commander, was appointed Chief of Staff. However, the
operation remains with its own command structure under Haftar. It’s
important that the House of Representatives and the government gain
effective control of these forces.
In
conclusion, recent international meetings have shown that the
international community’s interests are in not letting Libya collapse.
No one can allow it to. Nonetheless, the solution that must be found in
Libya, not just for momentary but for lasting stability, has to be the
most inclusive possible. This is the hardest road to take but the only
one that can bring results. The international community should de facto
foster creation of a new social pact between Libyan components, a real
attempt at nation-building whose first steps we see only now, hoping
that it’s not too late.
Source: Arturo Varvelli, ISPI Research Fellow
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