Lebanon, Hezbollah is caught in an Al-Qaeda vise
Il Libano è entrato in una nuova fase di instabilità, con i recenti attacchi contro Hezbollah e l'esercito libanese verificatisi in rapida successione nei giorni scorsi. Capire cosa sta accadendo può aiutarci a capire meglio cosa aspettarci in futuro in Libano... L'esercito è stato preso di mira nei giorni scorsi presso il checkpoint Awali e a Majdalyoun, nei pressi di Sidone, mentre un'autobomba è stata fatta esplodere nei pressi di una base di Hezbollah nella valle della Bekaa.
Those behind the bombings targeting Hezbollah were probably not the
same ones who attacked the Army, despite the media’s tendency to see
them as part of the same package. Officials have suggested the Sidon
attacks were carried out by followers of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. Given
their amateurishness, that may well be true.
But the car bomb in
the Bekaa, near the village of Sbouba, was a different matter. The large
quantity of explosives used and the fact that the blast occurred near a
Hezbollah base, which must have been under observation for some time,
indicated a level of professionalism similar to the one evident in the
bombings at the Iranian Embassy
in October. It also implied that those behind the attacks sought to
hit high-value military sites of the party, not just provoke carnage
among Shiite civilians.
If so, we can identify three categories
of actions in recent months: small-scale attacks against the Army,
indiscriminate bomb attacks against civilians, and more professionally
prepared attacks against Hezbollah and Iranian objectives.
The
first could possibly be a sign of greater militancy by Lebanese Sunni
Salafist groups, in Sidon and probably Tripoli. They are angry at the
Army’s assault against Assir’s mosque in Abra last June and feel that
its repeated arrest of Salafists reflects an implicit alliance with
Hezbollah and animus toward the Sunni community.
The attacks
against civilians have been a straightforward terror weapon against
(until now) Shiites, to show that there is a price to be paid for
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.
The third type of
attack, against political and military targets, may point to an effort
to shape the political and military environment in specific ways. The
Sbouba attack could have been linked to the party’s ongoing campaign in
the Qalamoun area of Syria; the blast at the Iranian Embassy was an
obvious political message that the Iranians, despite the presence of
Hezbollah, are vulnerable in Lebanon.
One thing is increasingly
clear: Such operations are taking place in a wider context of Al-Qaeda’s
reaffirming itself regionally, especially in a swathe of territory
stretching from Iraq to Syria and now extending increasingly to Lebanon. This has been characterized by the effort of Al-Qaeda franchises to seize territory and systematically eliminate all those, including Sunnis, who might stand in their way.
The
Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, which is active in Syria, is
an extension of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, so their actions in Syria and Iraq
must be viewed as part of a coordinated strategy. In Syria, ISIS and the
Nusra Front have, from the start, been concerned less with fighting the regime of Bashar Assad
than with carving out spaces in areas under the control of the Syrian
rebels and the Kurdish community. This territory, particularly Syrian
oil fields, has provided them with a steady source of income, therefore
leverage over other rebel groups.
In an effort to consolidate an
alternative Islamist alliance to Al-Qaeda, the Saudis formed the
so-called Islamic Front in November, made up of seven Salafist rebel
groups. Its ambition of creating an Islamic state
in Syria worries Western states, which believe no transitional
political project is feasible if it ignores the fears of Syria’s
minorities. However, in a sign of the confusion permeating American and
British policy on Syria, the Obama administration and the Cameron
government have just suspended aid to Syrian groups they had been
supporting, guaranteeing their further marginalization.
President Bashar Assad must be delighted. Reports this week indicate that the Syrian National Coalition
has been told by Western governments that the Montreux conference in
January should not lead to the removal of the Syrian president, for fear
that jihadists would exploit the ensuing vacuum. The SNC had said that
it would not attend the conference unless it led to a transition away
from Assad, so what this will mean for its participation remains
unclear.
Ultimately the political mess in Syria benefits both
Assad and Al-Qaeda in the medium term. The paradox is that Hezbollah,
the Assad regime and the United States are all, implicitly, on the same
side – which is precisely the conclusion the Assad regime wanted
everyone to reach when it allowed the jihadists to thrive.
The
only problem is that Hezbollah now finds itself transformed into cannon
fodder in a battle against Al-Qaeda, when its initial goal was merely
to defend Assad rule. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has claimed that his
party’s aim is to fight the “takfiris.” However, far more effective
forces than his have failed to triumph over Al-Qaeda. The only success
came when the United States collaborated with the Sunni Awakening
movement in Iraq to push the jihadists onto the defensive.
Hezbollah doesn’t have that capacity. The party has imported the Syrian
war to Lebanon, even if it is not the only one to do so. Its hubris has
been a curse to the country, and will remain so for some time.
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